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FINANCIAL CONTRACTING WITH THE CROWD
Usha R. Rodrigues
ABSTRACT
Equity crowdfunding is broken. The current model imposes too many
burdens on entrepreneurs in exchange for too little money. For alternative
models, this Article looks to the time-tested venture capital financial contract
and the recent experience of initial coin offerings (ICOs). ICOs made headlines
over the past two years as the means by which blockchain technology companies
raised billions of dollars to launch new cryptocurrency ventures. Although their
novelty as a monetary and investing device is well known, ICOs also presented
significant, unappreciated insights into financial contracting.
ICOs furnished an unprecedented experiment into how bargains would look
if entrepreneurs raised money for a venture directly from the general public
without government regulation. Although the setting was novel, the financial
contracts of the blockchain replicated mechanisms familiar from the venturecapital context that protect investors against uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs. ICO financial contracts suggest that familiar
venture capital contractual provisions such as vesting of founder ownership
interests, voting rights, and redemption rights are versatile tools that can protect
investors in a variety of settings—including equity crowdfunding. Thus, even if
ICOs may not prove a lasting phenomenon, regulators can apply their financial
contracting lessons to capital-raising from the crowd. Doing so has the potential
both to increase entrepreneurial access to capital and to democratize the
investing playing field.


M.E. Kilpatrick Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I thank participants in the
Notre Dame Corporate Governance Roundtable, Gregory Day, Joan Heminway, Dave Hoffman, Don
Langevoort, and David Wishnick. Mistakes are my own.

RODRIGUESPROOFS_12.5.19

398

12/9/2019 11:37 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:397

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 399
I. THE CRUMBLING OF THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE .... 404
A. The Public/Private Divide ........................................................ 405
B. Cracks in the Wall: Private Fundraising Moves Public ........... 409
C. More Cracks in the Wall: Equity Crowdfunding and Reg A+ .. 411
II. FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN THE VENTURE CAPITAL CONTEXT ...... 418
A. The Risks Investors Face .......................................................... 418
B. Contractual Protections for the Venture Investor .................... 421
1. Staged Financing ................................................................ 421
2. Control ............................................................................... 422
3. Compensation/Vesting ........................................................ 423
4. Redemption Rights .............................................................. 424
5. Reputation as an Extra-Contractual Discipline on
Investors ............................................................................. 424
III. FINANCIAL CONTRACTING WITH THE CROWD ................................... 425
A. Voice and Exit: The DAO ......................................................... 426
B. Post-DAO ICOs ........................................................................ 428
1. Voice and Exit .................................................................... 431
2. Limitation on Supply .......................................................... 432
3. Vesting/Compensation ........................................................ 432
4. Threshold Raise .................................................................. 434
5. Resale/Liquidity .................................................................. 435
C. Caveats ..................................................................................... 436
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION ............................................................. 440
A. Threshold Raise and the Power of Escrow ............................... 441
B. Exit, Voice, and Staged Financing ........................................... 443
C. Vesting ...................................................................................... 446
D. Liquidity/Resale ........................................................................ 446
E. Raising Crowdfunding Limits ................................................... 448
V. IMPLEMENTING THESE MECHANISMS WITHIN THE CURRENT
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK .............................................................. 449
A. Reg A+ ...................................................................................... 451
B. Intrastate Offering ..................................................................... 452
C. Section 28 ................................................................................. 456
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 457

RODRIGUESPROOFS_12.5.19

2019]

12/9/2019 11:37 AM

FINANCIAL CONTRACTING WITH THE CROWD

399

INTRODUCTION
Pabst Blue Ribbon Inc. (PBR) was up for sale in 2009, and two loyal patrons
wanted to prevent the iconic American company from suffering the same fate as
Budweiser, which had been sold to Belgian-Brazilian InBev the year before.1
The two men tried to crowdsource a bid for the company, creating a site called
BuyaBeerCompany.com.2 The pair obtained over $200 million in pledges from
approximately five million Americans, but the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) prohibited the campaign.3 According to the SEC, PBR’s would-be
acquirers were offering a security, and U.S. securities laws prohibit the sale of a
security to the general public to finance a firm without registering with the SEC
(in an initial public offering, or IPO), or qualifying for an exemption from
registration.4
Indeed, before 2012, “crowdfunding” was limited to Kickstarter-like
funding campaigns5 that rewarded funders with a nominal gift such as a T-shirt
or baseball cap. There was no way to raise money from the general public—or
the “crowd,” as this Article will sometimes call it—in exchange for a stake in
the underlying business.6 This limitation dates back to the Securities Act of
1933, which requires firms to register for an IPO before selling their securities
to the crowd.7 Any offer to sell shares in an actual business was thus off-limits—
including soliciting offers to buy a beer company.8
The somewhat whimsical PBR plan inspired U.S. Representative Patrick
McHenry (R-NC).9 He wanted to counter U.S. securities law’s “paternalistic
view that average investors can’t make these decisions for themselves.“10 The
1
Michael J. de la Merced, S.E.C. Stops Would-Be Buyers of Pabst Beer, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2011, 3:52
PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/s-e-c-thwarts-would-be-buyers-of-pabst-beer/; William Spain
& Steve Goldstein, Anheuser-Busch Accepts $52 Billion InBev Offer, MARKETWATCH (July 14, 2008, 5:39 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/anheuser-busch-accepts-52-billion (discussing the Budweiser takeover).
2
Merced, supra note 1.
3
Id.; Danielle Sacks, Shaking Up Crowdfunding, FAST COMPANY (May 14, 2012), http://www.
fastcompany.com/1835677/shaking-crowdfunding; SEC Cans Web Campaign to Buy Pabst Brewing, DENVER
POST (June 8, 2011, 3:39 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2011/06/08/sec-cans-web-campaign-to-buy-pabstbrewing/.
4
15 U.S.C. §§ 77c–e (2012); see Sacks, supra note 3.
5
See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
6
Larissa Lee, Note, The Ban Has Lifted: Now Is the Time to Change the Accredited-Investor Standard,
2014 UTAH L. REV. 369, 371 (noting that the pre-JOBS Act regulation “banned general advertising and general
solicitation”).
7
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa.
8
See Sacks, supra note 3.
9
Id.
10
Id.; Steve King, Congressman McHenry Promotes His Crowdfunding Bill and Trashes Competing
Senate Legislation, iPeopleFINANCE (Feb. 24, 2012), https://isellerfinance.wordpress.com/2012/02/24/
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problem McHenry sought to address was a simple one: How can companies—
especially small ones—raise equity financing from the general public?11 He
introduced a three-page bill that allowed ordinary investors to invest the lesser
of $10,000 or 10% of their annual income in companies seeking to raise up to
$5 million.12 McHenry’s straightforward bill ultimately became Title III of the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS), but along the way
Congress amended it to impose substantial requirements on aspiring
crowdfunding entrepreneurs.13 The SEC layered on even more requirements in
its final rule, which weighed in at 228 pages and over 1,700 footnotes.14 As a
result, equity crowdfunding, capped at only $1.07 million, is widely regarded as
not being worth the effort.15
As Part I describes, private fundraising has long offered an alternative
funding source to the IPO, for those entrepreneurs willing to seek out funds from
a more limited group of accredited (i.e., wealthy) investors,16 and able to meet
the requirements of a “private offering” to raise funds. These private offerings
allow for experimentation precisely because they occur outside the gaze of
securities regulators.
Accredited and institutional investors can invest in private offerings because
they are deemed able to “fend for themselves”17—and fend for themselves they
must. Investors contemplating investing in a fledgling venture confront
significant problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.18
They are free to contract as they see fit to address these issues, without regulatory
intervention. As Part II.B will describe, a rich literature has detailed financial

congressman-mchenry-promotes-his-crowdfunding-bill-and-trashes-competing-senate-legislation/ (noting that
McHenry discusses the need to loosen the rules in this space).
11
Cf. King, supra note 10 (noting McHenry’s statement that “[o]nerous regulation is holding back
businesses seeking to raise capital”).
12
H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011).
13
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–305, 126 Stat. 306, 315–23 (2012).
14
Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232,
239, 240, 249, 269, & 274).
15
See infra Part I.C.
16
Rule 506 of Regulation D describes several categories of accredited investors, including certain banks,
charitable organizations, and certain high net worth individuals, who may invest in securities that are not
registered. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2017). Most notably, for the purposes of this Article, individuals with a net
annual income of over $200,000 or a total net worth of over $1 million may invest in securities that are not
registered, provided that those securities meet the general disclosure requirements of Rule 502. Id.
§§ 230.251(d)(2)(C), 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (allowing such persons to invest in unregistered securities). This
division explains why average investors cannot invest in hedge funds, nor in private companies such as Airbnb
or Chick-fil-A until they go public.
17
Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3420 (2013).
18
See infra notes 150–152 and accompanying text.
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contracting terms in the venture financing realm—like the vesting of founder
equity, and staged financing—that strike the appropriate balance between
entrepreneur capital-raising and investor protection.19 The literature argues that
venture capital’s (VC) financial contracting aligns the incentives of company
and investor,20 and helps explain the success of VC-backed companies ranging
from Apple to Google to Lyft in raising hundreds of millions of dollars while
avoiding burdensome IPO requirements.
On the public side, however, the securities laws and the SEC create a choke
point. There is little room for private ordering between investors and
entrepreneurs because any offer of a security for sale to the general public must
pass muster with the SEC.21 The SEC will occasionally allow for
experimentation,22 but these instances are at the regulators’ whim. Thus, any
experiments are at best an imperfect approximation of the contractual terms the
public market might desire, if left to its own devices, to contract for its own
protection.23
Without the possibility of such experimentation, Congress and the SEC are
left to articulate rules that both foster capital formation and provide adequate
investor protection. While the crowdfunding rules and regulations might not
strike the proper balance between disclosure, regulatory burden, and investor
protection, there generally has been no way of knowing what would work. Yet
two examples offer as-yet unexplored models for what investor protection might
look like in the equity crowdfunding context.
The financial contracting of venture capital funding and initial coin offerings
(ICOs) offer examples of what kinds of investor protections equity
crowdfunding might offer. An ICO is an offering of specialized crypto tokens,24
19

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
21
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (2012) (prohibiting the sale of unregistered securities to the public).
22
See, e.g., Anita Balakrishnan, Snapchat Officially Files for IPO, CNBC (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:37 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/02/snap-ipo-s-1-filing.html (stating that Snapchat “noted that unlike almost
every public offering on the market, the two co-founders will control ‘all stockholder decisions’”).
23
To be more precise, of course, the general public is a dispersed group of individuals that could not
“bargain” for its own protection with the firm, in the sense of dickering over terms. But entrepreneurs looking
to raise capital from the crowd, unmediated by state actors, would inevitably include certain contractual investorprotection mechanisms in their offerings, to entice potential investors. Over time, we could determine which
protections command a premium, presumably because the crowd perceived them to be the most valuable in
terms of protecting them and ensuring the overall venture’s success.
24
These offerings are generally referred to as initial coin offerings because the early offerings were of
coins—that is, actual cryptocurrency. See Ivona Skultetyova, Short History of ICOs: From Crypto Experiment
to Revolution in Startup Financing, MEDIUM (Feb. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@ehvLINC/short-history-oficos-from-crypto-experiment-to-revolution-in-startup-financing-709c23839ffc (noting the initial idea was to
20

RODRIGUESPROOFS_12.5.19

402

12/9/2019 11:37 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:397

with the promise that those tokens will operate as a medium of exchange when
the blockchain venture is complete.25 The funds raised in the ICO are used to
continue to develop the blockchain technology and bring it to market.
It is worth pausing here to underline the radical break that ICOs represent.
Using the blockchain, early ICO promoters were able to evade SEC regulation
entirely. For the first time since the advent of federal securities regulation in
1933, entrepreneurs could raise significant money—in some cases the
equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency—within a matter
of weeks, without investment bank intermediaries, the SEC, or accountants.26 In
July 2013, MasterCoin launched what is regarded as the first initial coin
offering,27 which raised about $500,000 in bitcoin.28 Just three years later, the
decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) raised $150 million worth of
cryptocurrency.29 The SEC has moved to stem the tide of ICOs, and that
regulatory intervention, coupled with an overall drop in cryptocurrency values,30
issue “Mastercoins”). New cryptocurrencies later evolved that allowed coders to layer different contracts on top
of a single cryptocurrency platform. Id. For example, the Ethereum blockchain launched with an ICO in 2014,
with a currency called ether. From Crowdfunded Blockchain to ICO Machine: An Ethereum Price History,
SFOX (Apr. 5, 2018), https://blog.sfox.com/from-crowdfunded-blockchain-to-ico-machine-an-ethereum-pricehistory-ddb31c3134c4 [hereinafter Ethereum Price History]. It permitted entrepreneurs to code projects on the
blockchain, exchanging ether for so-called “tokens” to be used in those projects built on top of the Ethereum
blockchain. Ameer Rosic, What Is an Ethereum Token: The Ultimate Beginner’s Guide, BLOCKGEEKS,
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/ethereum-token/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
25
THOMAS BOURVEAU ET AL., INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS: EARLY EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE
IN THE UNREGULATED CRYPTO MARKET 3–4 (2018).
26
Antonio Madeira, The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Mar. 12,
2019), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/ (noting
that the DAO crowdfunded $150 million worth of cryptocurrency).
27
Chance Barnett, Inside the Meteoric Rise of ICOs, Forbes (Sept. 23, 2017, 1:21 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2017/09/23/inside-the-meteoric-rise-of-icos/; see Dominik Zynis,
A Brief History of Mastercoin, OMNI (Nov. 29, 2013), https://blog.omni.foundation/2013/11/29/a-brief-historyof-mastercoin/ (noting that Mastercoin launched July 2013).
28
Laura Shin, Here’s the Man Who Created ICOs and This Is the New Token He’s Backing, FORBES
(Sept. 21, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/09/21/heres-the-man-who-createdicos-and-this-is-the-new-token-hes-backing/#5b8658231183.
29
Madeira, supra note 26; PERRIE M. WEINER, CHRISTOPHER C. PACI & KIRBY HSU, CRYPTOCURRENCIES
AND ICOS: AN SEC ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE 1 (2018), https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/files/people/
weiner-perrie/508486_0_perrie-weiner-dla-piper-article---cyrptocurrencies-and-icos---an-secperspective.pdf?la=en&hash=EEEA9DB6205D34435089A5C44C8A996A874F63D8; Kai Sedgwick, 46% of
Last Year’s ICOs Have Failed Already, BITCOIN (Feb. 23, 2018), http://news.bitcoin.com/46-last-years-icosfailed-already/; Andrew Tar, SEC Ruling on the DAO and ICO, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (July 27, 2017),
https://cointelegraph.com/explained/sec-ruling-on-the-dao-and-ico-explained. Ethereum, an early ICO success
story, raised about $18 million in bitcoin. Ethereum Price History, supra note 24. Similar early successes led
the way for the ICO explosion that occurred in 2017. Barnett, supra note 27. ICOs raised about $3.7 billion in
2017, through more than 900 sales.
30
See, e.g., Brad Tuttle, Bitcoin Prices Just Hit a New Low. Here’s How Much You Would Have Lost If
You Bought at the 2018 Peak, MONEY (Nov. 15, 2018), http://money.com/money/5455877/bitcoin-price-2018-
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means that ICOs have become less prevalent and less successful.31 Indeed,
regulators have proved deeply suspicious of ICOs because their early success
also attracted fraudsters.32 Part IV of this Article will explain ICOs further, but
for present purposes all that matters is that ICOs offered—for a limited time,
before the SEC cracked down on them—an example of financial contracting for
funds from the general public, unfettered by government intervention.
This Article is the first to take the financial contracting of ICOs seriously.
The literature of venture capital financial contracting, detailed in Part III, has
offered deep insights into how contractual mechanisms can protect investors
from risk, but focused on private capital-raising. ICOs offer many of the same
protections in the context of public capital-raising. These twin models, though
unlike in many ways, nonetheless can each offer insights into possibilities for
crowdfunding.
One major takeaway from comparing the contracting of venture financing to
that of ICOs is the universality of the risks of uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs.33 These problems plague both public and private
investors.34 Unsurprisingly, given this universality of concerns, ICO contractual
terms echo the very terms venture investors include—terms like enforced
vesting of founder ownership interests, voting rights, and exit rights.35 But ICO
financial contracts also include terms tailored to the particular needs of the
blockchain (like limitations on supply)36 and terms that reflect the special
concerns that accompany fundraising from the crowd (like a requirement that
fundraising reach a certain threshold level before being released).37
Equity crowdfunding can, but to date has not, employ some of these
peak-low/.
31
See Sritanshu Sinha, IEOs, ICOs, STOs and Now IDOs—How to Raise Funds for Crypto in 2019?,
COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 1, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ieos-icos-stos-and-now-idos-how-to-raisefunds-for-crypto-in-2019 (noting the “decline of initial coin offerings”).
32
A Wall Street Journal study of 1,450 ICOs revealed 271 with signs of fraud, including “plagiarized
investor documents, promises of guaranteed returns and missing or fake executive teams.” Shane Shifflett &
Coulter Jones, Buyer Beware: Hundreds of Bitcoin Wannabes Show Hallmarks of Fraud, WALL ST. J. (May 17,
2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/buyer-beware-hundreds-of-bitcoin-wannabes-show-hallmarksof-fraud-1526573115. Many are tempted to view these efforts as attempts to sell the Brooklyn Bridge to the
gullible. Stephen T. Black, Psst! Wanna Buy a Bridge? IP Transfers of Non-Existent Property, 31 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 523, 576 (2015).
33
Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) (“All financial contracts respond to three central problems: uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of agency costs.”).
34
See id. (noting that such problems are central to “[a]ll financial contracts”).
35
See infra Part III.B.
36
See infra Part III.B.2.
37
See infra Part III.B.4.
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mechanisms to protect investors and facilitate capital raising. This Article
advocates exploring the escrow mechanism as a means to introduce staged
financing, with its concomitant empowering of investors by delaying the followon investment decision, as well as other protections.
ICOs may have waned in popularity but concerns about wealth disparities
and financial inequity have not. Equity crowdfunding was meant to make it
easier for small businesses to raise capital, while at the same time allowing the
general public for the first time to invest in private firms. Yet currently
crowdfunding is hampered by burdensome regulation and risks becoming, if it
is not already, a market for lemons.38
The takeaway from the contracting of both ICOs and venture financing
suggests that investors face common risks and use common strategies to mitigate
them. Current equity crowdfunding fails to implement these strategies, but this
Article argues that these mechanisms would improve crowdfunding and enable
Congress to more safely raise the $1.07 million limit.39 After acknowledging
some potential limitations to the ICO model, Parts V & VI will describe the
various paths Congress, the SEC, and state regulators might take should they
choose to apply financial contracting lessons to make crowdfunding a viable
source of capital for small firms, and at the same time a safer investment for the
crowd.

I.

THE CRUMBLING OF THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE

This Article will focus on financial contracting in the venture capital and
ICO context as a counterpoint to the above-described crowdfunding regulations.
But first, this Part will provide the context to understand how unique the
crowdfunding opportunity to experiment with private ordering in the public
markets was. It will also explain how the traditional limitations on private
investments—prohibitions against general solicitation, resale limitations, limits
on the number of private company investors and on the amount they can raise—
have gradually fallen by the wayside. As private companies start to look more
and more like public ones, the old arguments for keeping the public markets
separate from the private ones may no longer hold as much water.
Section A of this Part will describe how traditionally investors faced a tradeoff between private and public capital raising. Raising money from the general
public was expensive and complicated, but it allowed fundraising from the
38
39

See infra Part I.C.
See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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crowd and the ability to resell securities freely.40 On the flip side, private capital
raising was cheaper and easier, but generally restricted sale to the wealthy and
limited the right of resale.41 Section B of this Part will describe how the lines
between these two forms of capital raising have blurred considerably, allowing
private offerings to look much more public. Section C will describe equity
crowdfunding and its attendant problems.
A. The Public/Private Divide
For years, an equilibrium of sorts existed in the securities world, one rooted
in a strict divide between two markets.42 On one side of the divide lay private
markets, policed by fraud, which allowed for relatively small-scale fundraising
from wealthy individuals and institutions.43 Resale of securities was both legally
and practically difficult.44 On the other side lay public markets, policed by
disclosure, which allowed companies to raise millions of dollars and enjoy a
liquid secondary market.45 Entry into those public markets was costly and came
by way of an intermediary, an investment bank that shepherded a company
through an initial public offering.46 For the entrepreneur seeking to raise capital
by selling a security, there were two options: (1) register the security with the
SEC in an IPO or (2) shoehorn the offering into an exemption from the
registration requirement, and conduct a private offering, with all its attendant
limitations.
Before describing the public/private divide further, it is worth noting the
potential—in theory, at least—of a third path. Rather than registering a security
offering with the SEC or finding a way to exempt it from registration,
enterprising entrepreneurs have repeatedly tried to argue that what they are
selling does not qualify as a security at all.47 If not a security, no registration is
needed.48 In fact, ICO developers attempted this very argument,49 and ultimately
failed to convince the SEC for one reason: the Howey test.

40
C. Steven Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution: A New Approach to Securities
Registration Exemptions, 49 EMORY L.J. 437, 483 (2000).
41
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
42
See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public
Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 453 (2017) (noting that law creates a “sharp divide” between the two markets).
43
Bradford, supra note 40, at 452.
44
Id. at 483–84.
45
De Fontenay, supra note 42, at 461.
46
See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
47
See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
48
See 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2012) (requiring registration only for securities).
49
See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
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The Securities Act defines a security as a laundry list of financial
instruments, most of them familiar (“stock, … bond”) and some more exotic
(“debenture, … fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights…”).50 In the middle of the list is the phrase “investment contract,”51 an
undefined term that has become a catchall provision, capturing pay phones,52
earthworms,53 chinchillas,54 and other questionable assets offered for sale.
Courts could hold that such disparate assets qualified as securities because
of the power and flexibility of a test the Supreme Court enunciated in 1946 in
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.55 The Howey test first required that the investment be
“solely from the efforts of others.”56 Courts have not interpreted “solely”
literally, but instead have inquired as to whether “the efforts made by those other
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”57 Second, Howey
required that there be an expectation of profit,58 which the Court later defined as
(1) “capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial
investment” or (2) “participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors’
funds.”59 Third, an investment contract requires a “common enterprise.”60
Any attempt to raise funds in a common enterprise where profits will be
derived solely from the efforts of others winds up getting classified as an
investment contract, and thus a security, under the capacious Howey test.61 Thus,
Howey has thwarted countless efforts to find an end-run around the securities
laws—including, most importantly, the ICO.62

50

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
Id.
52
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 392 (2004).
53
Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1979).
54
Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Grp., 494 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1974).
55
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
56
Id. at 301.
57
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
58
Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
59
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). The Supreme Court interpreted
Howey’s requirements more broadly over time. For example, in SEC v. Edwards, it held that the promise of a
fixed rate of return qualified as an expectation of profit. 540 U.S. 389, 395 (2004).
60
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99. Courts agree that horizontal commonality, which looks at the relationships
between an individual investor and the pool of other investors, meets the Howey test, but are less clear on whether
the relationship between the investor and the promoter is enough to satisfy the common enterprise element. See
Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460, 462 (1978). These need not concern us, however.
61
In SEC v. Lauer, Judge Richard Posner found that a scheme involving only one investor could qualify
as a common enterprise, because the promoter represented that the investment would be pooled with others. 52
F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 1995).
62
See infra Part III.B.
51
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Having disposed of the putative “third way” of avoiding securities
regulation, we can return to the dichotomous world of public and private capital
raising. Access to the public markets comes via the IPO, which Robert
Thompson and Donald Langevoort call a “rite of passage.”63 What a rite of
passage it is. Public offerings are subject to regulations even before they are sold
to the public.64 Gun-jumping rules provided by the SEC work to tamp down
public excitement before the offering itself.65 Entrepreneurs must register with
the SEC before going public, a lengthy and expensive process that helps ensure
that investors have a sufficient quantity of information before the sale.66 By
assigning underwriters and experts with strict liability for misstatements in the
prospectus, subject to a limited due diligence defense, the securities laws put the
deep pockets and reputation of investment banks on the hook.67 They effectively
deputize the investment banks conducting the offering to police the prospectus
for fraud.68
In the end, however, the payoff is substantial. Once public, issuers can sell
to anyone.69 The securities laws subject public companies to ongoing reporting
requirements of increasing rigor and complexity, ensuring that post-IPO
purchasers of securities are kept well-informed.70 These disclosures occur at
regular intervals (supplemented with updates as needed), and follow a standard
formula, ensuring investors can assess risks uniformly.71 Their purchasers can
resell freely, and do so knowing that the company is subject to ongoing reporting
requirements.72 This promise of continual disclosure makes for a robust
secondary market.73 The promise of subsequent liquidity on the secondary
63
Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation
After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 352 (2013).
64
See id.
65
See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
66
See de Fontenay, supra note 42, at 448.
67
Merritt B. Fox, Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities: First Principles, 66 DUKE L.J.
673, 688–89 (2016).
68
See Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1636 (2010) (discussing the
liability—subject to a due diligence defense—of these “gatekeepers”).
69
See de Fontenay, supra note 42, at 461.
70
See Public Companies, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/howmarket-works/public-companies (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) (providing a brief overview of ongoing disclosure
requirements); cf. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1361 (1999) (discussing the heightened disclosure requirements created by
the law).
71
See Public Companies, supra note 70 (providing brief overview of disclosure by public companies and
noting that “[p]ublic companies must continue to keep their shareholders informed on a regular basis”); see also
Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 146–48 (2009) (discussing different views on whether
standard, uniform disclosures, as required by the law, are better than disclosures crafted by a firm’s discretion).
72
Bradford, supra note 40, at 483.
73
Rodrigues, supra note 17, at 3427.
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markets correspondingly boosts the price of the initial offering—people will pay
more for something they know they can resell.74 And companies can return to
the public capital markets to conduct secondary offerings at far less expense than
the original IPO.75
For firms that preferred not to undergo this rite of passage, traditionally the
private markets remained. These provided quicker access to capital, at a cheaper
price.76 But the market was limited largely to those investors who could fend for
themselves.77 Private offerings were—and still largely are—reserved for
accredited investors78—i.e., the wealthy.79
Securities laws also constrained the manner in which private firms could
advertise for investors.80 Before the JOBS Act, sellers of securities in private
offerings could not even advertise offers to the general public, a practice termed
general solicitation.81 No billboards, no magazine ads, no internet banners, no
tweets.82 In part because of this limitation, even the existence of these kinds of
investments was largely hidden from the average investor.
This private securities market was policed mainly by fraud, and was
relatively illiquid, both because of regulatory impositions, and because of the
lack of ongoing disclosure.83 In brief, you had two choices. You could sell to the
private markets cheaply and quickly, but with limits on general solicitation, the
total number of investors, and resale rights for the securities sold. Or you could
list publicly, which would take time and money, but would enable general
solicitation to the public capital markets and your shares to be sold to an
unlimited number of investors who would enjoy unlimited liquidity. It was a
choice between a difficult offering process that created easy resale, or an easy
offering process that imposed more limitations on the firm’s fundraising postoffering.

74

Id. at 3393.
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1265 (2001).
76
Joseph F. Jacob, Note, The Impact of the Euro on the United States Equity Markets, 13 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 399, 413–14 (1998).
77
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
78
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
79
17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2017) (currently defined as those with over $1 million of liquid assets or income
of $200,000 for each of the past two years).
80
Lee, supra note 6, at 369.
81
See id. (noting that in 2013, the “Securities and Exchange Commission lifted an eighty-year ban on
general solicitation and general advertising”).
82
See id. (discussing the ban on general solicitation).
83
Id. at 378–79.
75
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The typical justification for this stratified investment landscape is that it
makes good sense for the wealthy—and only the wealthy—to have access to
private offerings.84 Privately traded securities may be illiquid for years and are
complicated to understand. For these reasons, they generally pose more risk than
public securities. While higher risk is often accompanied by higher return, that
is not always the case—and the law judges wealthy investors to be the more
appropriate bearers of the heightened risk private offerings present by reserving
them for accredited investors.

B. Cracks in the Wall: Private Fundraising Moves Public
As we will see in Section C, the JOBS Act introduced equity
crowdfunding—for the first time, the general public could invest in shares of
still private companies. On the flip side, shrewd political advocacy led by Silicon
Valley introduced measures to allow private companies to become larger than
ever before, raising more and more money from more and more people with
more and more opportunities for resale on the secondary markets.85 This Section
will highlight only a few aspects of this blurring, those that make today’s private
offerings look a lot more public than those of the past.
The JOBS Act allowed for general solicitation in two new areas: Reg A+86
and Rule 506(c).87 Rule 506(c) created a new exemption that loosened the
strictures against general solicitation.88 Under the old Rule 506, an issuer needed
a reasonable belief that any offeree qualified as an accredited investor.89 The
JOBS Act directed the SEC to lift the prohibition against general solicitation
provided that “all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.”90 The
SEC created guidelines for the reasonable steps that companies must take to
ensure that all purchasers are, in fact, accredited.91
At the same time, the JOBS Act also enabled private companies to stay
84
See Rodrigues, supra note 17, at 3395 (“[P]rivate firms are only able to sell their shares to a subset of
the public—the wealthy.”).
85
Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson have thoughtfully chronicled this blurring of the public and
private spheres. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 338–39 (discussing Facebook’s economic tactics
and the government’s interest in helping the “high-tech” companies).
86
Technically the Section 3(b)(2) Exemption, but commonly referred to as Reg A+. Reg A+ is discussed
in the next Section. See infra Part I.C.
87
Christian W. Borek, Comment, Regulation A+: Navigating Equity-Based Crowdfunding Under Title
IV of the JOBS Act, 47 CUMB. L. REV. 143, 154–55 (2016); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2017) (amending
Regulation A pursuant to the JOBS Act).
88
Borek, supra note 87, at 154–55.
89
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(ii) (2012), repealed by 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(ii) (2017).
90
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012).
91
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2019).
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private longer, keeping them out of the public’s reach for years. Until the JOBS
Act, Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) had
required that firms with assets of over $10 million, and a class of securities held
by over 499 shareholders of record, register their securities under the Exchange
Act.92 This “500 shareholder rule” functioned as a de facto limit on how large a
company could get—at least, on how many shareholders it could have.93 Section
12(g) explains why Google and Facebook went public when they did—although
these firms did not require the money from their IPOs when launched, they
would have been subject to disclosure requirements under the Exchange Act
after crossing the 500 shareholder mark.94 They therefore made the calculus that
they “might as well” go public.95 The JOBS Act raised this number to 2,000, so
long as no more than 500 are unaccredited.96 Thus, firms like Airbnb could raise
money without being forced into an IPO as Google and Facebook were.
Moreover, these bigger companies raising money from more investors can
now sell shares that offer far more liquidity than in the past.97 The Southern
District of New York in United States v. Sherwood suggested that a two-year
holding period would ensure that purchasers of securities had an investment
intent as opposed to having a view towards resale.98 Rule 144 originally
enshrined that two-year holding period in regulation, but now has reduced it to
as little as six months for companies that are subject to the Exchange Act’s
reporting requirements.99 Langevoort and Thompson point out how a
combination of technological innovation and the regulatory loosening under
Rule 144 has permitted, as a functional matter, far more liquidity in the private
markets than used to be the case.100
On the flip side, this blurring also manifests by making public companies
take on characteristics more often seen in private firms. When these bigger

92
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE EXCHANGE ACT RULE 12G5-1 AND
SUBSECTION (B)(3), at 1 n.3 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/authority-to-enforce-rule-12g51.pdf.
93
Usha R. Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption, 31 J.L. & POL. 45, 48 (2015).
94
Id. at 51.
95
See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g), 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529,
1537–38 (noting that Facebook went public sooner than it otherwise would have because of § 12(g)).
96
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (2015); Rodrigues, supra note 95, at 1549. It also exempted crowdfunding
investors from the shareholder count. Id. at 1530 n.3.
97
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 347.
98
175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
99
Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,546, 71,546–47 (Dec. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239). Issuers not subject to the reporting requirements are subject to a one-year holding period
before public resale. Id. at 71,546.
100
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 33, at 350–51.
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companies finally choose to access the public markets, they are increasingly
choosing to retain a key feature of many private firms: control.101 The founders
of Google, Facebook, Lyft, Roku, Spotify, and Dropbox each retained a special
class of supervoting shares, meaning that they were ensured voting control of
the company even if they only retained a minority of shares.102 Snap went the
farthest down this path, selling shares to the public that lacked a vote entirely.103
This phenomenon of going public while retaining a key feature of private firms
further illustrates the blurring of the boundary between public and private.
C. More Cracks in the Wall: Equity Crowdfunding and Reg A+
Further blurring the definition of a “private” firm, equity crowdfunding has
allowed the general public to invest in private offerings since 2016, thus
theoretically democratizing capital on two fronts.104 For the first time, average
investors had a chance to directly invest in private firms, an opportunity that
used to be only open to the wealthy.105 At the same time, entrepreneurs now have
access to funding from the general public, thus offering alternatives outside of
the rarefied venture capital world for start-ups to raise funding.106
At least, this is the theory. Obtaining equity crowdfunding under the SEC’s
rules and regulations is an arduous process. This Section will describe that
process in painful detail, to underscore its daunting complexity for entrepreneurs
and its unworkability. But first, it will briefly describe a perhaps more promising
101
Rani Molla, More Tech Companies Are Selling Stock that Keeps Their Founders in Power, VOX (Apr.
11, 2019, 10:14 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/11/18302102/ipo-voting-multi-dual-stock-lyft-pinterest;
James Royal, The Hidden Risk in Many Tech IPOs, BANKRATE (May 21, 2019), https://www.bankrate.com/
investing/hidden-risk-investing-tech-ipos/; see Zoe Condon, Comment, A Snapshot of Dual-Class Share
Structures in the Twenty-First Century: A Solution to Reconcile Shareholder Protections with Founder
Autonomy, 68 EMORY L.J. 335, 349–50 (2018) (noting that firms are using dual-class shares to insulate from
short-term market pressure).
102
Molla, supra note 101; Royal, supra note 101.
103
Kurt Wagner, One Way Snapchat’s IPO Will Be Unique: The Shares Won’t Come with Voting Rights,
VOX (Feb. 21, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2017/2/21/14670314/snap-ipo-stock-voting-structure.
104
Howard Marks, What Is Equity Crowdfunding?, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/12/19/what-is-equity-crowdfunding/#7185f0ee3b5d.
105
Michael Vignone, Inside Equity-Based Crowdfunding: Online Financing Alternatives for Small
Businesses, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 806 (2016). One caveat is in order: Currently, much of the public’s
investment in the public markets is by way of intermediaries such as pension funds and mutual funds. Steven M.
Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 339, 347–48 (2008). Similar intermediaries could, in theory, allow for retail investment in startups and earlier
stage private ventures. Currently, a small percentage of mutual funds offer some exposure to such investments,
although most cap their exposure at 2%. Jeff Benjamin, Some Mutual Fund Investors Might Unwittingly Already
Own Shares of Lyft, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 28, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20190328/FREE/190329924/some-mutual-fund-investors-might-unwittingly-already-own-shares-of.
106
Vignone, supra note 105, at 806.
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move to facilitate fundraising from the crowd—Reg A+.107
Reg A+ provided for offerings of up to $50 million with more relaxed
disclosure requirements (and allowed for general solicitation).108 Some
commentators have gone so far as to call Reg A+ offerings “mini-IPOs.”109
Since general solicitation is permitted, others have treated Reg A+ as equivalent
to crowdfunding.110 Although each of these analogies misses the mark, Reg A+
offerings and equity crowdfunding do pose similar challenges to investors. Part
VI.A will address how ICO insights might apply specifically to the Reg A+
context, but until then this Article will treat them as functionally equivalent.
While these provisions made it easier for private corporations to raise funds
from the public, Reg A+ offerings still require “audited financial statements, a
description of the issuer’s business operations, its financial condition, its
corporate governance principles, its use of investor funds, and other appropriate
matters.”111 These disclosures typically necessitate hundreds of thousands of
dollars in fees.112 So while these offerings theoretically provide a way for a startup to raise money, they require significant pre-offering investment. Because of
this handicap, public support has been tepid.113 Part VI.A will suggest that the
financial contracting lessons gleaned from ICOs and venture financing can
address this hurdle. But for now, we turn to equity crowdfunding.

107
Lou Bevilacqua, So What’s Wrong with Reg A+?, BEVILACQUA PLLC (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.
bevilacquapllc.com/whats-wrong-reg/.
108
Id. The JOBS Act provided for both, and more. Borek, supra note 87, at 185–86. Whereas in the past,
private offerings could not even be advertised to the general public, Section 506(c) permitted general solicitation,
as long as any eventual sale was only to an accredited investor. Id. at 155. Crowdfunding for the first time
allowed private investors the access to public capital, but it capped investment at $1 million and came with
regulations so onerous as often not to be worth the effort. See Paige M. Lager, Note, The Route to Capitalization:
The Transcendent Registration Exemptions for Securities Offerings as a Means to Small Business Capital
Formation, 94 TEX. L. REV. 567, 599 n.233 (2016) (discussing investment caps). Regulation A+ allowed for up
to $50 million to be raised with disclosures less onerous than the traditional IPO. Id.
109
See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Henry Manne and Nonpublic Company Disclosure, 12 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 361, 367 (2016); Louis Anthony Steiner, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Critical Examination
of Regulation A+ and Its Rationales, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 155, 162 (2017).
110
Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661, 664 n.16; Tyler Stewart, More
Info on New SEC Crowdfunding Rules: What Regulation A+ Means for Real Estate, REALCROWD, https://www.
realcrowd.com/blog/2015/04/more-on-what-sec-regulation-a-means-for-real-estate-crowdfunding/ (last visited
Aug. 23, 2019).
111
15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(G)(i) (2012).
112
See ANZHELA KNYAZEVA, REGULATION A+: WHAT DO WE KNOW SO FAR? 13 (2016) (showing that
the median cost of a Reg A+ filing is approximately $205,000).
113
See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The SEC's Regulation A+: Small Business Goes Under the Bus
Again, 104 KY. L.J. 325, 343 (2015) (noting that there were few Tier 2 filings even after Reg A+); Neal Newman,
Regulation A+: New and Improved After the JOBS Act or a Failed Revival?, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 243, 278
(2018).
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By design, firms can raise only a limited amount from the public—no more
than $1,070,000 of securities in any twelve-month period.114 Would-be
crowdfunding investors face a corresponding limitation, and can only invest in
any twelve-month period: (i) the greater of $2,200 or 5% of the annual income
or net worth of such investor, as applicable, if either the annual income or the
net worth of the investor is less than $107,000; or (ii) 10% of the annual income
or net worth of such investor, as applicable, not to exceed a maximum aggregate
amount sold of $107,000, if both the annual income and net worth of the investor
are equal to or more than $107,000.115 Regardless of annual income or net worth,
one’s investment may not exceed $107,000.116 As we will see, equity
crowdfunding requires much effort for would-be entrepreneurs to raise only
limited sums from the crowd.
First, of course, a company must qualify. Only certain companies are eligible
to seek crowdfunding in the first place.117 It must next select a crowdfunding
platform.118 Crowdfunding rules require offerings to be conducted exclusively
through an online platform operated by an intermediary broker-dealer or funding
portal (a new kind of intermediary created by the Act) that is registered with the
SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.119 Start-ups may rely on
the intermediary’s efforts in calculating the aggregate amounts of investments
in order to comply with the investment limits described above.120
After selecting a platform, crowdfunding entrepreneurs must draft and file a
Form C , the required offering statement, with the SEC and the online platform
intermediary.121 Form C requires the issuer to fill out basic information about
the company, including information about the officers, directors, and large
shareholders; a description of the business and use of the proceeds; the price of
114
Investor Bulletin: Crowdfunding Investment Limits Increase, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(May 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_crowdfundingincrease (increasing cap
due to inflation). Section 4(a)(6) was redesignated Section 4(a)(6) of that Act by Pub. L. No. 112-106,
§ 201(b)(1), (c)(1), 126 Stat. 314 (2012), and is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
115
Investor Bulletin, supra note 114 (raising caps due to inflation); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)
(2012).
116
17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2) (2017); Investor Bulletin, supra note 114 (raising cap due to inflation).
Spouses may calculate their net worth and annual income jointly with the investor. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2).
117
Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (May 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm#2.
Excluded companies include non-U.S. companies and companies that have no specific business plan or that have
indicated their business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies.
Id.
118
Id.
119
15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1)–(2); 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100(a)(3), 227.300.
120
See generally Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 117.
121
17 C.F.R. § 227.203.
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the securities and the target offering amount; and the company’s financial
condition and financial statements.122
Selecting the target amount is an important choice in terms of regulatory
repercussions and will emerge as an important concept later, so it merits close
attention. The SEC requires disclosing both the offering target and the deadline
to reach the target offering amount.123 The offeror must include a statement that
if the target offering amount is not reached or exceeded by the deadline, “no
securities will be sold in the offering, investment commitments will be cancelled
and committed funds will be returned.”124 Thus, equity crowdfunding is an allor-nothing proposition. A would-be crowdfunder must raise a minimum amount
or return all the funds raised. The target amount sets the floor at which an
offering can be viable. It also creates a perverse incentive for crowdfunders to
lowball the target amount they claim required for viability.125
After reaching 50% and 100% of the target offering amount, the start-up
must update the SEC, investors, and the intermediary on its progress within five
business days.126 If the start-up receives investments in excess of the target
offering amount, it must file another form reporting the total securities sold in
the offering.127
The target amount also determines the type of financial statements required
to be filed with the SEC. For instance:
 If the issuer is offering $107,000 or less of securities, the issuer must
provide its financial statements and information from the issuer’s federal
income tax return, both of which must be certified by the principal
executive officer.128 If the issuer’s financial statements have been
reviewed or audited by a public accountant that is independent of the
issuer, then it must provide such financial statements.129
 If the issuer is offering between $107,000 and $535,000 of securities, it
122
Form C Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/formc.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
123
17 C.F.R. § 227.201(g).
124
Id.
125
CCH FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW REPORTS NO. 2766, 13 (2017) [hereinafter FSLR NO. 2766] (“Because
funding is an all-or-nothing proposition, there is an incentive to set a small minimum of about $20,000 to $50,000
and leave the ceiling at the regulatory maximum of $1 million. This may work from the point of view of a
company desperate for money, … but it may not be as good for investors if the company really did need a large
amount of money to do what it wanted to do.”).
126
17 C.F.R. § 227.203(a)(3). The update is provided through Form C-U. Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. § 227.201(t)(1).
129
Id.
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must provide financial statements audited by a public accountant that is
independent of the issuer, or, if no such audit occurred, then financial
statements reviewed by a public accountant that is independent of the
issuer.130
 If the issuer is offering more than $535,000 of securities and is offering
under the Regulation Crowdfunding exemption for the first time, the
financial statements must be audited or, if unavailable, reviewed by an
independent public accountant.131
 If the issuer is offering more than $535,000 of securities and has
previously sold securities using the Regulation Crowdfunding
exemption, the financial statements must be audited by an independent
public accountant.132
Concern about a speculative frenzy in advance of the IPO necessitates so-called
gun-jumping laws that limit what the firm communicates to the public during
the IPO process.133 In a nod to these anti-gun-jumping rules, the SEC requires
that crowdfunders limit advertising to the general public. Crowdfunders must be
careful not to advertise the terms of their offering unless it is in a notice that
directs investors to the intermediary’s platform and describes no more than: (1)
that the issuer is conducting an offering pursuant to Section 4(a)(6), the name of
the intermediary, and a link to the intermediary’s platform; (2) the terms of the
offering; and (3) certain limited facts about the business.134
Start-ups may compensate their promoters through communication channels
provided by the intermediary, but only if the start-up takes reasonable steps to
ensure that the promoter is clearly disclosing the compensation with each
communication.135
Even after a crowdfunding company successfully sells shares to the public,
restrictions continue to apply to the investors. The securities sold through the
crowdfunding exemption cannot be sold for one year unless the securities are
transferred (1) back to the issuer; (2) to an accredited investor; (3) as part of an
130

Id. § 227.201(t)(2).
Id. § 227.201(t)(3).
132
Id.
133
A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private
Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1003 (2013).
134
17 C.F.R. § 227.204(a)–(b); Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, 38 SEC
Docket 843, 852–53 (Feb. 9, 1959) (“[T]he danger to investors from publicity amounting to a selling effort may
be greater in cases where an issue has ‘news value’ since it may be easier to whip up a ‘speculative frenzy’
concerning the offering by incomplete or misleading publicity and thus facilitate the distribution of an unsound
security at inflated prices.”).
135
17 C.F.R. § 227.205(a).
131
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offering registered with the SEC; or (4) to a family member “of the purchaser or
the equivalent, to a trust controlled by the purchaser, to a trust created for the
benefit of a [family member] or the equivalent, or in connection with the death
or divorce of the purchaser or other similar circumstance.”136
The old adage has it that “it takes money to make money.”137 Given these
restrictions and requirements, perhaps it is unsurprising that only 3% of business
owners believe that the crowdfunding rules will increase their likelihood of
raising capital.138 Commentators believe crowdfunding will be underused
because of the “realities of crowdfunding”—that is, “small startups generally
lack access to venture capital funds, underwriters, broker-dealers, and legal
counsel necessary to help them comply with the JOBS Act’s rules and
regulations.”139 The estimated cost to an issuer seeking to raise $100,000 in
securities is at least $17,967,140 making crowdfunding a fairly expensive way to
raise capital. The North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.
(NASAA) noted that it will likely be difficult for start-ups to keep track of the
individual investment requirements and thresholds (especially the individual net
worth and annual income requirements).141 Start-ups risk being liable for their
brokers’ or crowdfunding portals’ illegal acts or for failing to pay back
investors.142
All these requirements may be too burdensome for an entrepreneur to
realistically take advantage of them.143 Additionally, the $1 million limit may be
too low for the typical start-up company. For example, the average and median
seed-stage financing were around $1.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2014.144
The limit, “an unnecessary restriction on a company’s ability to grow,” forces
companies to conduct parallel or multiple offerings to raise money under Title

136

Id. § 227.501(a).
Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in
the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership Society”, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 90
(2005).
138
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the Federalist Society's Panelist
Discussion Titled “Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act”, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 453, 468 (2013).
139
Id. at 470.
140
Max E. Isaacson, The So-Called Democratization of Capital Markets: Why Title III of the JOBS Act
Fails to Fulfill the Promise of Crowdfunding, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 439, 457 (2016).
141
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Regulation
Crowdfunding (Feb. 3, 2014), nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NASAA-Comment-Letter-onRegulation-Crowdfunding-Final.pdf.
142
See Peter C. Sumners, Crowdfunding America’s Small Businesses After the JOBS Act of 2012, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 38, 46 (2012).
143
Id. at 47.
144
Isaacson, supra note 140, at 454.
137
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III.145 In response to concerns about the paltriness of the $1 million ceiling,
Patrick McHenry, the author of the original JOBS Act crowdfunding bill,
introduced the Fix Crowdfunding bill in 2016 that sought to increase the limit to
$5 million.146
Worse yet, equity crowdfunding as envisioned by Congress and executed by
the SEC may have created a “lemons problem.”147 If crowdfunding is so
burdensome, then only low-quality start-ups that cannot find funding by other
means will use it, as a funding type of last resort.148 Even quality start-ups
seeking crowdfunding would be tainted by the overall market reputation, and
would not be able to distinguish themselves from bad ones.149 There are some
indications, as Part IV.E will further describe, that some of the securities being
offered for crowdfunding offer very little upside to investors, thus reinforcing
market-for-lemons concerns.
In sum, equity crowdfunding has been a reality for almost three years, but it
is far from perfect. In some sense, these imperfections are unsurprising. Given
the nature of our securities laws, Congress was in the best political position to
initiate equity crowdfunding. It had less to lose than the SEC, which would
inevitably bear the brunt of criticism should average investors be defrauded by
crowdfunding investments. But Congress is hardly the ideal body to task with
creating an optimal equity crowdfunding regime. It has no special expertise in
securities, and it makes policy based on conflicting reports and testimony from
various groups, each with their own concerns. Even without descending into an
assessment of special interests and public choice theory, it is clear that any
legislative attempt to allow the general public—without the sophistication or
sheer resources of private investors—to invest in private companies would be
fraught. When allowing the general public for the first time to participate in risky
and illiquid private investments, the balance inevitably tilted towards investor
protection and away from facilitating capital formation. The SEC, an agency
with a lot to lose if average investors are defrauded in a private crowdfunding
scheme, layered on still more regulations. The unwieldy Regulation
145

Id. at 454–55.
Disrupter Series: Improving Consumers’ Financial Options with Fintech: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Dig. Commerce & Consumer Prot. of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce H.R., 115th Cong. 88
(2017); see Fix Crowdfunding Act, H.R. 4855, 114th Cong. (2016).
147
See Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 564
(2015).
148
See Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 517–20 (2014)
(discussing certain restrictions and requirements that lead entrepreneurs to choose options other than equity
crowdfunding if they have the choice).
149
Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 591. Michael Dorff predicted the same in Dorff, supra note 148, at 508.
146
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Crowdfunding was perhaps an inevitable result.
Because of the nature of U.S. securities law, experimentation on how best to
raise funds from the general public has not been common. This Part described
the initial trade-off between private and public capital raising. Recent reforms
have loosened the restriction on private capital raising. On the public side, the
corresponding loosening has been limited to the relatively unsatisfying equity
crowdfunding and Reg A+ described in this Section. But the recent wave of
ICOs proved a rare moment of experiment in unfettered capital raising from the
crowd. The next Part will look for lessons from the literature on private capital
financial contracting, which will provide useful context and counterpoint for
evaluating ICOs’ financial contracting in Part IV.
II. FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN THE VENTURE CAPITAL CONTEXT
This Part will look more closely at traditional private offerings. Investors
here, lacking the protections of federal disclosure requirements and the liquidity
of a vibrant secondary market, face acute risks when contemplating investing in
private firms. This Part will first describe these risks, and then describe the
financial contracting venture investors have used to address them. These features
provide one model of investor protection crowdfunding can fruitfully draw
upon.
A. The Risks Investors Face
As we have seen, the lines are blurring so that private offerings appear much
more like public ones. On the public side, Howey’s broad definition of what
constitutes a security, coupled with the requirement that any public offering be
registered with the SEC, dampens the prospects for creativity in contracting to
raise funds from the public. Given that an oft-skeptical SEC necessarily
interpolates between the company and its public investors, contractual
experimentation is relatively rare for public offerings.
No such limitation exists on the private side. As long as the offering can
qualify as a private offering under an exemption from registration requirements,
experimentation is feasible. Such freedom to contract has led to contractual
mechanisms that address the most common problems facing firms looking to
raise money: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.
To concretize these common problems, let’s take a simple scenario. A
would-be entrepreneur has a promising idea. She needs an investor to help her
develop it and is willing to split any resulting profits from the project. The
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financial contracting literature has addressed this problem extensively. It begins
with the insight that all contracts are necessarily incomplete, including financial
contracts.150 No one contract can at the outset anticipate all of the eventualities
that might unfold over time.151 Parties need a contract that will fill in the gaps
that will arise in the course of their relationship. Uncertainty is a core problem
they share; how will the project fare? Future exigencies are inherently
unpredictable to both parties. But the investor also suffers from a separate
information asymmetry problem: Presumably the entrepreneur will know more
about the merits and promises of the project. The potential investor will find it
hard to separate realistic assurances from mere puffery from unscrupulous or
simply deluded entrepreneurs.152 Finally, the ever-present danger of agency
costs lurk—the fear that the entrepreneur will shirk or appropriate private
benefits to herself rather than faithfully serving the needs of the entity as a
whole.153
The financial contracting literature has focused on the private markets,
typically on venture contracts.154 For the uninitiated, a venture capital fund
typically raises capital from accredited investors for a ten-year duration.155 The
fund is structured as a limited partnership, with the manager serving as the
general partner (GP) and managing the investment portfolio.156 The accredited
investors serve as the limited partners, enjoying limited liability, and generally
providing passive capital.157
The GP evaluates investment opportunities on behalf of the fund.158 Early in

150

Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 461,

463.
151
See id. at 478 (noting that contractual incompleteness makes it impossible to have a protective provision
that could cover all possible instances of controlling party opportunism).
152
In the words of George Triantis, “information is too soft to be communicated to investors in a credible
manner.” George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
305, 307 (2001) (reviewing PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (1999)); see also
Fox, supra note 67, at 680 (“When an issuer first contemplates making a public offering of truly new securities,
there exist particularly large information asymmetries.”).
153
See Gilson, supra note 33, at 1076 (“All financial contracts respond to three central problems:
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of agency costs.”); see also Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
154
See, e.g., Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1079, 1084–85 (2001).
155
Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs, 37 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 849, 861, 863 (2013).
156
Id. at 861–62.
157
Id.
158
See id. at 861 (“[T]alented venture capital managers spot promising companies and (arguably) provide
advice that helps pave the road to success.”).
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the fund’s life, it will make investments in portfolio companies.159 This part of
the financial contract—i.e., the relationship between VC fund and portfolio
company—teaches the most important lessons in financial contracting for
crowdfunding because it deals with the problem of how an investor can contract
to protect herself against the entrepreneur. Whether the potential investor is
crowd or capitalist, the basic problems are the same.
The venture financing context is instructive because there are sophisticated
parties on each side,160 relatively free to order their contractual relationship as
they see fit. Early-stage companies pose a great deal of uncertainty because
“[v]irtually all of the important decisions bearing on the company’s success
remain to be made, and most of the significant uncertainties concerning the
outcome of the company’s efforts remain unresolved.”161 Compounding the
uncertainty is the unproven nature of the start-up’s management team, and that
so much of the company’s value depends on management’s decisions.162
The same lack of operating history also contributes to information
asymmetry: “[I]ntentions and abilities are far less observable than actions
already taken.”163 It is unclear to the investor how the entrepreneur will respond
to the crucible of internal and external pressures of growing a business.
Moreover, the entrepreneur, as the individual on the ground working for the
business, will have far more knowledge of its growth prospects than an investor
on the outside looking in.164
Finally, agency costs are a perennial concern in any business organization.165
They are a product of the fact that the entrepreneur, as the residual claimant, has
in effect an option on the future growth of the firm.166 The entrepreneur will
share in the firm’s eventual profits, but only if they are big enough to provide
the investor with a healthy return on her investment.167 In this setting, agency
costs manifest in the temptation for the manager to slack off or divert profits
159

Id. at 866.
Even first-time entrepreneurs are usually represented by lawyers deeply embedded in the venture
capital world. See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 683 (1996) (discussing the
significance of Silicon Valley attorneys’ interactions with both investors and entrepreneurs).
161
Gilson, supra note 33, at 1076–77. Gilson argues that the high-tech setting exacerbates these costs. Id.
at 1076 (“[I]nvesting in early stage, high technology companies presents these problems in an extreme form.”).
The uncertainty problem is one all start-ups share.
162
Id. at 1077.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 1081–83.
165
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 309.
166
Gilson, supra note 33, at 1077.
167
See id.
160
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(enjoying 100% of the return on such efforts in the form of increased leisure or
perquisites like foosball tables), rather than striving for future uncertain gains,
which she would be forced to share with her investors.
B. Contractual Protections for the Venture Investor
Venture financing contracts have well-established mechanisms for
addressing the perennial risks of uncertainty, asymmetric information, and
agency costs. This Section will address these mechanisms.
1. Staged Financing
Say an entrepreneur pitches a venture capitalist an idea that requires a $30
million investment. The VC is intrigued but—given the above-described
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and risk of agency costs—reluctant to
commit such a large sum of money up front. To address this reluctance, the
typical early-stage venture contract allows for staged financing, where
investments occur over multiple rounds of financing.168
At the initial stage of financing, the financial contract will provide the cashhungry entrepreneur with only, say, $2 million, and will articulate a particular
milestone, a deliverable that provides a point at which the investor can judge the
project’s interim success or failure.169 If and when the firm reaches that
milestone, the investor will feel more comfortable committing, say, $10 million.
The achieved milestone mitigates the uncertainty problem by deferring
further financial commitment until more time has passed. But this delay also
mitigates information asymmetry problems in two ways.170 First, it gives the
investor the chance to evaluate the firm’s progress towards market without
having to rely on the entrepreneur’s assurances about future occurrences.171
More subtly, the investor will also have had the chance to observe the CEO’s
managerial and work habits, providing more data points for assessing the
venture’s future success. Staged financing favors those entrepreneurs willing to
168
J.K. Sharma & Smita Tripathi, Staged Financing as a Means to Alleviate Risk in VC/PE Financing, 19
J. PRIV. EQUITY 43, 43–45 (2016). Michael Klausner and Kate Litvak call staged financing the “[m]ost
important” of all the VC’s risk-reduction techniques. Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have
Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP: LINKING
GOVERNANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY 54, 56 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001) (“Most important among these
contract terms is the staged nature of the venture capital investment.”).
169
Gilson, supra note 33, at 1078–79.
170
Guarav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage—Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71 BUS. LAW. 427,
430 (2016).
171
Id. at 430.
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commit to milestones as a check on the credibility of the projections they have
promised their investors.172
Not only does staged financing reduce uncertainty and information
asymmetry, it also reduces agency costs by motivating the entrepreneur to
perform in order to receive future funding. Entrepreneurs have less room to slack
because they only receive a portion of their needed funds up front.173

2. Control
As part of their initial investment, venture funds bargain for control rights
disproportionately larger than their ownership share.174 Venture capitalists
negotiate for seats on the board of directors, giving them a window into the
portfolio company’s finances, policies, and prospects.175 But more than
transparency on these questions, board representation also gives venture
capitalists a voice in the ongoing management of the firm. The power to exert
this type of control goes a long way towards reassuring VCs ex ante that their
interests will be protected.
In addition to having a positive say in the firm’s management, these investors
also bargain for contractual limitations on the entrepreneur’s discretion.176
Venture firms negotiating an investment in a portfolio company often obtain
separate vetoes at the board level and the shareholder level.177 For example,
before incurring more than $50,000 in debt, the corporation may need the
affirmative vote of both the venture directors (separate and apart from overall
board approval) and the vote of the preferred shareholders.178
Granting board representation rights assuages the problems of information
172
Gilson, supra note 33, at 1081 (“[T]he entrepreneur obviously has better information concerning the
accuracy of the business plan's projections of timing, costs, and likelihood of success. Without more, the
entrepreneur has an obvious incentive to overstate the project's prospects. By accepting a contractual structure
that imposes significant penalties if the entrepreneur fails to meets specified milestones based on the business
plan's projections—the venture capital fund's option to abandon then becomes exercisable—the entrepreneur
makes those projections credible.”); see also Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory
Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 304
(2003) (discussing VCs’ use of staged financing).
173
See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
174
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54
UCLA L. REV. 37, 53 (2006).
175
D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 325 (2005).
176
See Gilson, supra note 33, at 1085 (discussing this as an effect of board control).
177
Bartlett, supra note 174, at 53–54.
178
This separate shareholder vote protects against a situation where a director representing a venture fund
might be constrained by her fiduciary duties into voting to permit an action. The venture fund as shareholder,
operating without such fiduciary constraints, operates as a separate backstop in such cases.
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asymmetry by inviting the investor into the company itself. As a board member,
the venture investor converts into a company insider who has access to inside
information about the company’s current situation and future prospects. By
giving the investor both positive (i.e., a seat on the board) and negative (i.e.,
itemized vetoes) control rights, the financial contract diminishes the threat of
uncertainty at the initial investment stage. These mechanisms reduce the risk of
agency costs by restricting the entrepreneur’s discretion. In particular, the
negative covenants tie the entrepreneur’s hands by putting limits on how much
she can borrow, spend, or pay out without the investor’s permission.
3. Compensation/Vesting
The CEOs of VC-backed firms typically receive relatively low salaries,
coupled with large grants of stock options or, more commonly, outright grants
of restricted stock.179 This combination means that the size of the entrepreneur’s
compensation depends on the overall success of the venture.180 Moreover, a
four-year cliff-vesting schedule is common, whereby the entrepreneur must
work for a solid year before being rewarded with any equity at all in the
venture.181 Under this schedule, if a CEO is fired even eleven months into the
job, she will only have received a relatively low salary for her labor.182 Even
after a year, only one-quarter of her ownership interest vests. Her remuneration
remains tied not only to the eventual success of the venture, but also to her
continued commitment to work for the organization.
The compensation structure of the venture-funded company thus
incentivizes the entrepreneur to maximize the long-term growth of the company.
Founders who slack will be summarily fired and left with nothing. Even those
who survive the first year will only receive a fraction of the total equity available
to them, and that fraction will only be valuable if the overall value of the
company continues to grow. Indeed, even the diligent entrepreneur who
increases the company’s value through her hard work will likely only receive a
tangible return upon exit—either an IPO or an acquisition. Thus, the
compensation provisions work to align the incentive of investor and
entrepreneur to grow the company towards a successful exit.

179

Gilson, supra note 33, at 1083.
Id. (“[T]he overwhelming percentage of management’s compensation is dependent on the portfolio
company's success.”).
181
Joseph L. Lemon, Jr., Don’t Let Me Down (Round): Avoiding Illusory Terms in Venture Capital
Financing in the Post-Internet Bubble Era, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1, 45 (2003).
182
Gilson, supra note 33, at 1083.
180
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4. Redemption Rights
Redemption occurs when the company repurchases shares from investors
pursuant to a contract.183 In effect, then, redemption rights function as a “refund”
right for investors. These provisions fulfill two functions: (1) they give the
investor a way to recoup her original investment from a stagnant or failing
company; and (2) they “provide the venture capitalist with leverage over the
entrepreneur based on the credible threat of withdrawal.”184 Not all venture
contracts provide for redemption rights, and their incidence varies by region.185
Redemption rights, in essence a right for investors to get their money back,
tend not to be immediately exercisable.186 This fact is an implicit
acknowledgement that an immediate redemption right would create a different
kind of cost. It is only fair to require a venture capital fund to do enough due
diligence up front to commit to an investment of several years. But after several
years have passed, such a right can be a potent tool, or at least threat, for the
investor.187 “The threat of using a redemption right, which would create a
horrible financial strain on the company, focuses founders and management on
the fact that venture capital investors want out of their investment quickly, and
after five years they are getting impatient.”188
5. Reputation as an Extra-Contractual Discipline on Investors
The above contractual rights, by cabining the discretion of the entrepreneur
to protect the investor against uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
costs, create a concomitant risk of opportunistic exploitation by the investor.189
A key insight from Gilson is that a reputation market constrains this investor
opportunism.190
Because the venture community is relatively tight-knit, and venture funds
183
Smith, supra note 175, at 348. Mandatory redemption provisions require the company to repurchase
shares at a specified date, while put options give the investor the option to sell the shares back to the company
whenever she chooses. Id. at 348–49.
184
Id.
185
Redemption rights are much more common in deals on the East Coast of the United States and relatively
rare on the West Coast. Dana M. Warren, Venture Capital Investment: Status and Trends, 6 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 505, 521 (2011).
186
See Smith, supra note 175, at 349.
187
Warren, supra note 185, at 521 (“[I]f the company is doing well, investors do not want to be redeemed.
If the company is doing poorly, it typically does not have the resources to complete a redemption without
committing a fraud on its creditors.”).
188
Id.
189
Gilson, supra note 33, at 1085–86.
190
Id. at 1086.
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tend to invest in close geographic proximity to their fund office,191 a company
seeking to raise funds will have access to a great deal of information about
would-be investors. A successful fund will create reputational benefits for the
fund manager, who can then go on to raise subsequent, ideally larger, pools of
capital on the strength of the earlier strong performance. The success of these
future funds is contingent upon persuading likely portfolio companies to accept
the future fund’s investment. As Gilson observes:
Credible accounts of opportunistic behavior by particular GPs can be
expected to circulate quickly among members of the entrepreneur
community, who must select a GP with whom to deal, and among
members of the GP community, who must compete among themselves
for the opportunity to invest in the most promising portfolio companies
and therefore have an interest in noting and transmitting to the
entrepreneur community instances of misbehavior by a rival.192

In short, having a reputation as an opportunistic or unfair investor will limit a
fund’s ability to invest in future companies. Knowing that, VCs generally
behave themselves.
III. FINANCIAL CONTRACTING WITH THE CROWD
As we have seen, parties have developed mechanisms on the private side to
protect investors from the threats of future uncertainty, asymmetric information,
and agency costs. No such experimentation traditionally has occurred in the
public market context.193 Public fundraising, since 1933, has developed in
response to congressional fiat, as modulated by the SEC.194 Title III of the JOBS
Act did introduce equity crowdfunding,195 but Congress and the SEC engaged
in what might generously be called educated guessing when striking a balance
between protecting investors and fostering capital raising. As we saw in Part
II.C, equity crowdfunding remains an unattractive mode of fundraising for most
entrepreneurs.
ICOs permitted, at least for a brief time, a way for entrepreneurs to raise
capital quickly via equity securities, using blockchain technology to evade the
191
Jason Rowley, Where Venture Capitalists Invest and Why, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 9, 2017, 11:45 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/09/local-loyalty-where-venture-capitalists-invest-and-why/.
192
Gilson, supra note 33, at 1087.
193
Jack Wroldsen published a survey of crowdfunding investment contracts, but these contracts represent
financial contracting within the cramped confines of what Congress and the SEC has permitted. Jack Wroldsen,
Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543 (2017).
194
See generally Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 117.
195
Id.
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reach of the SEC.196 A veritable ICO explosion occurred in 2017.197 ICOs raised
about $7 billion in that year,198 through nearly 600 sales.199 Section A of Part IV
will describe an early ICO called a decentralized autonomous organization
(DAO), which launched in 2016.200 The DAO foundered on the shoals of flawed
coding, but while it flourished, it provided a short-lived end-run around U.S.
securities laws. After describing the DAO, Section B will turn to a survey of
later ICOs to glean further common ICO financial contracting terms. Some of
these, such as vesting, are already familiar, but there were also blockchainspecific terms, such as limits on supply, to provide restraints that traditional
organizations contract for in their organizational documents. Finally, Section C
will address some objections to looking to the ICO experience for guidance in
crowdfunding.
A. Voice and Exit: the DAO
The DAO developers envisioned a kind of alternative business organization
that, once launched, could run on the Ethereum blockchain without directors,
officers, partners, or other human actors.201 Instead, the code of the blockchain
itself would dictate the rules and relationships between the DAO’s owners, the
so-called tokenholders.202 During an initial funding phase, investors could send
ether, the cryptocurrency coin of the Ethereum realm, to the DAO’s account,
receiving DAO “tokens” in return.203 These tokens bought into a kind of
“automated investment fund.”204 This scheme may seem somewhat implausible,
but the DAO initial offering was a tremendous success.205 It raised over $150
million of cryptocurrency in a matter of months and served as the model for
future ICOs.206
196

See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
DANIEL DIEMERS ET AL., INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS & A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 3 (2018).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Madeira, supra note 29.
201
Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 699 (2019). Building upon the
success of Bitcoin, the Ethereum blockchain allowed so-called “smart contracts” to be layered on top of
transactions, which are automatically executed upon the fulfillment of the terms contained in the code. Id. at
698–99. Thus, whereas the Bitcoin blockchain records transactions such as “A paid B 12 bitcoin,” the Ethereum
blockchain’s code allows transactions such as “A will pay B 12 ether if the Green Bay Packers win the Super
Bowl.”
202
Id. at 699, 701.
203
See id. at 680.
204
The DAO of Accrue, ECONOMIST (May 19, 2016), https://www.economist.com/finance-andeconomics/2016/05/19/the-dao-of-accrue.
205
Madeira, supra note 29.
206
Id.; Andrew Tar, SEC Ruling on the DAO and ICO, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (July 27, 2017),
https://cointelegraph.com/explained/sec-ruling-on-the-dao-and-ico-explained. The projects were funded with
197
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With the pool of $150 million in investable funds amassed, the next step was
for the DAO tokenholders to vote on particular projects proposed to the fund.
An early proposal was to develop a physical lock that could be opened remotely,
to allow Airbnb-style access to homes for rent.207 Just as a corporation’s
shareholders receive the right to one vote per share they hold, each token gave a
tokenholder a right to vote on whether to fund each project.208 After being
proposed to the DAO tokenholders, the project was debated for a minimum of
two weeks, followed by a vote on the proposal.209 After the debate period
concluded, any tokenholder could require the DAO to verify that a quorum was
reached and a majority of votes were cast in favor of the proposal.210
The DAO developers, quite self-consciously, coded in both voice211 and
as protective mechanisms, the self-same mechanisms that venture
exit
capitalists also use.213 Indeed, one could call the DAO a virtual venture-capital
fund, because its main purpose was to invest in new projects. And because it
could sell ownership interest on the blockchain using cryptocurrency, it was able
(for a time, at least) to avoid the choke hold of the SEC and sell securities to the
general public.214
212

The DAO organizers provided not only for voice, but also for exit. Christoph
Jentzsch, one of the DAO’s developers, was particularly concerned that the
minority would become vulnerable to majority oppression once a fund was
raised.215 Jentzsch proposed an exit mechanism to protect the minority from this
type of oppression: a split.216 If a tokenholder disagreed with a proposal that the
the DAO’s accrued ether.
207
Ian Allison, Ethereum-Based Slock.it Reveals First Ever Lock Opened with Money, INT’L BUS. TIMES,
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ethereum-based-slock-reveals-first-ever-lock-opened-money-1527014 (last updated
Dec. 17, 2015, 1:15 PM); see also Decentralized Smart Devices with Stephan Tual from Slock.it, POSTSCAPES,
https://www.postscapes.com/iot-voices/interviews/smart-devices-ethereum-stephan-tual (last visited Oct. 26,
2019).
208
Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance 1–2
(unpublished white paper) (on file with Emory Law Journal).
209
Id. at 2.
210
Id. Quorum requirements were initially set at 20%, unless a proposal was for the transfer of all ether
the DAO had ever received, in which case a quorum of 53.33% was required. Id. If a proposal was approved,
the DAO would send ether to a small contract representing the proposed project to fund the project. Id.
211
See supra notes 208–210 and accompanying text.
212
See infra notes 215–219 and accompanying text.
213
See supra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.4.
214
See Tar, supra note 206 (noting that the SEC declared on July 25, 2017 that Blockchain companies are
required to follow federal securities laws).
215
Jentzsch, supra note 208, at 2. His specific concern was a “majority robs minority attack.” Id. An
investor who acquired 51% could easily propose to send all the funds to herself. Id. As the majority holder, they
would be able to pass this proposal and appropriate the DAO’s funds. Id.
216
Id.
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majority proposed, or simply wanted to withdraw its ether before the proposal
was funded, it could propose to form a new DAO, termed a “split DAO” or
“child DAO.”217 Tokenholders that voted to split could move their portion of the
DAO’s ether to a new DAO.218 There was no quorum requirement, allowing any
single tokenholder to exit the DAO on his or her own.219
Some readers might already have spotted the similarity between the “split
DAO” right of exit and the redemption rights VCs sometimes receive. These
rights of exits also resemble the appraisal rights found in mergers. We will revisit
these rights in Part V.B.
All these carefully thought-out forms of investor protection came to naught.
Ultimately, the DAO foundered on a coding flaw—a so-called “recursive bug”
that allowed a tokenholder to siphon off $50 million worth of cryptocurrency
from the DAO.220 The organizers were able to unwind the transactions that led
to this debacle, through a process known as “hard forking” the blockchain, and
the DAO investors received their cryptocurrency back.221
The DAO, then, was a failure. But it signaled an appetite for this kind of
offering to the general public, with certain contractual protections in place. The
DAO also had effects on the evolution of ICOs, as the next Section will describe.
For that, we must return to securities law and the Howey test.
B. Post-DAO ICOs
Recall that the Howey test defines the catchall “investment contract”
category of securities requiring registration under the Securities Act, or
exemption from it.222 The SEC issued a post-mortem report of investigation
fifteen months after the DAO’s unwinding, classifying the DAO tokens as
securities under the Howey test.223 This classification should not have been
surprising—the DAO was an investment of money in a common enterprise (the
217
Id. at 2, 9; see also David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK (June 25, 2016, 4:00
PM), https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists (referring to a split off DAO as a “child
DAO”).
218
Jentzsch, supra note 208, at 2.
219
Id. at 3.
220
See Rob Price, Digital Currency Ethereum Is Cratering Because of a $50 Million Hack, BUS. INSIDER
(June 17, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/dao-hacked-ethereum-crashing-in-value-tens-ofmillions-allegedly-stolen-2016-6.
221
Jeffrey Berns, Understanding Ethereum and the DAO Conundrum, ETH NEWS (July 5, 2016, 6:12
PM), https://www.ethnews.com/understanding-ethereum-and-the-dao-conundrum.
222
See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
223
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 81,207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO 1 (2017) [hereinafter DAO REPORT OF INVESTIGATION].
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DAO itself), to which profits derived from the efforts of others. The SEC did not
pursue an enforcement action because investors received their money back,224
but the agency had nevertheless drawn a line in the sand. ICOs were fair game,
and the SEC’s position was that they were investment contracts under Howey,
and thus securities under the Securities Act.
After the SEC’s DAO Report, ICO entrepreneurs spent countless hours and
dollars trying to evade the reach of Howey, and thus of the SEC and U.S.
securities law. They turned back to that familiar argument for evading the reach
of U.S. securities law, claiming that their offerings were not securities at all.225
They tried to distinguish their offerings from the DAO by stripping them of
governance and ownership features and characterizing them as mere tokens226
meant for consumption (utility or consumption tokens), rather than investment
contracts over which the SEC could legitimately claim jurisdiction.227 By
analogy, imagine a musician who sells tickets to a future concert well in advance
in order to raise money for the venue and cost of production. The ticket does not
represent an ownership right, but instead a right to consume the concert at a
future date.228 ICO issuers had good reason to try to claim the tokens and coins
they sell are not securities: Buyers of securities sold without an exemption from
the Securities Act’s registration requirements are entitled to rescission—that is,
224

Id.
Rodrigues, supra note 201, at 726.
226
A word of explanation is perhaps in order. “Coins” technically refer to cryptocurrencies like bitcoin,
ether, and litecoin. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC are on record as saying these
assets are not securities, but instead are currency. Neeraj Agrawal, SEC Chairman Clayton: Bitcoin Is Not a
Security, COIN CTR. (Apr. 27, 2018), https://coincenter.org/link/sec-chairman-clayton-bitcoin-is-not-a-security.
Some coins, like ether, function as platforms that allow for smart contracts to be coded on top of them, creating
decentralized applications that work on their blockchains. See supra note 201. The DAO, one of the first of
these, took in ether in exchange for tokens that worked within the DAO. See supra note 203 and accompanying
text. Tokens work only within a single project’s ecosystem. Cf. Shermin Voshmgir, Tokenized Networks: What
Is a DAO?, BLOCKCHAINHUB, https://blockchainhub.net/dao-decentralized-autonomous-organization/ (last
updated July 2019) (discussing “native … tokens” to the networks). While they can serve as means of exchange
(i.e., currency), they can also allow for features like vote, distribution rights, and use rights. See supra Part III.A.
Confusingly, many ICOs, although acronyms for initial coin offerings, could more properly be referred to as
token offerings. The SEC’s guidance avoids this terminological thicket by using the term “digital assets” to refer
to both tokens and coins. Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digitalassets#_edn2 (last updated Apr. 3, 2019) (“The term ‘digital asset,’ as used in this framework, refers to an asset
that is issued and transferred using distributed ledger or blockchain technology, including, but not limited to, socalled ‘virtual currencies,’ ‘coins,’ and ‘tokens.’”).
227
Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the
Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 486 (2019).
228
This analogy carries us only so far, because a reputable musician on tour would refund the
concertgoers’ money for a canceled concert. According to the ICO offerors, there is no right of rescission. All
you are buying is the right to use something in the future—and you bear the risk of loss if it fails to develop into
something of worth.
225

RODRIGUESPROOFS_12.5.19

430

12/9/2019 11:37 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:397

a refund of the full purchase price.229 Utility token issuers seek to evade this
possibility of rescission by claiming that they are not selling securities at all.
The market trend of reconfiguring tokens from equity offerings into socalled consumptive goods faced two problems: (1) in general, the public bought
tokens or coins not to use them, but as an investment,230 and (2) the SEC has
reiterated that utility tokens are in fact securities, and therefore subject to
regulation.231 Moreover, the market move towards the fiction of utility tokens is
unfortunate for our purposes—a misguided (and ultimately doomed) attempt to
skirt securities laws.
In short, because the SEC characterized the DAO tokens as securities, future
entrepreneurs avoided the ownership features of the DAO in an attempt to argue
that they were not securities under the Howey test. I will ignore this attempt to
describe ICO offerings as “consumptive goods” as disingenuous and ineffective.
In other words, no matter what ICOs are calling themselves, I will assume that
people bought them primarily for speculative investment purposes rather than as
consumptive goods.232 What concerns us, to the extent that these tokens
represented an ill-fated attempt at investment opportunities masquerading as
something else, is that they offered certain contractual protections to their
would-be investors. The point for our purposes is that entrepreneurs viewed
these contractual mechanisms as attractive to the crowd, and the crowd agreed,
at least in theory.
Entrepreneurs promised that these protections were coded into the
blockchain itself.233 Conveniently, Shaanan Cohney et al. have described key
protective mechanisms of ICOs.234 Their survey compares the promises
229

Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2012 & Supp. III 2015).
Anna Irrera, Steve Stecklow & Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, Special Report: Backroom Battle Imperils
$230 Million Cryptocurrency Venture, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2017, 6:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usbitcoin-funding-tezos-specialreport/special-report-backroom-battle-imperils-230-million-cryptocurrencyventure-idUSKBN1CN35K.
231
Jack Mathis, ICOs Are Securities, ‘Don’t Know How Much More Clear I Can Be’: SEC Chairman,
CCN, https://www.ccn.com/icos-are-securites-dont-know-how-much-more-clear-i-can-be-sec-chairman/ (last
updated June 14, 2018, 2:00 AM).
232
In April 2019, the SEC issued a framework for analysis of the Howey test, focusing most of its guidance
on the requirement of a reasonable expectation of profits derived from efforts of others. Bill Hinman, Statement
on “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets”, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-framework-investment-contract-analysisdigital-assets.
233
Shaanan Cohney et al., Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 630 (2019).
234
Id. at 630–31, 634. This article describes a further attribute of ICOs, modifiability. Id. at 630. A key
promise of the ICOs is that the blockchain is a “trustless” mechanism. Id. at 612. Because protections are coded
into the smart contracts of the blockchain, investors need not trust the entrepreneur. See id. (discussing promise
of trustless market). A chief protection, then, is the immutability of the blockchain code itself—but at the same
230
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contained in the white papers (text documents that ICO promoters typically
release to describe and promote their projects)235 with the actual blockchain code
that supposedly made good on the developers’ promises.236 Unfortunately, the
authors found that, whether due to mistakes in the code or outright fraud, ICO
promises often did not match reality.237 It goes without saying, and yet bears
saying, that a contractual protection coded into the blockchain is only as strong
as the code itself.238 The DAO itself is a reminder of that. But the Cohney study’s
finding of flawed coding, troubling as it might be for individual ICO investors,
does not affect the usefulness of ICO contracts as guidance for our purposes.
Even if the ICOs did not actually deliver on the promised contractual protections
they offered the crowd, their presence means either the crowd valued the
protections or the entrepreneurs presumed they would. Thus, they may serve as
a useful guide to what contractual features would best serve a more conventional
company seeking to raise funds from the general public.
1. Voice and Exit
The SEC’s report described how DAO tokenholders’ voting rights
resembled those of public company shareholders, and it used this fact to bolster
its argument that DAO tokens were securities under the Howey test.239 As we
have seen, post-DAO ICOs largely eschewed granting voting rights in order to
distinguish them from the DAO tokens.240 But, as I argued above, it would be a
mistake to interpret the post-DAO utility tokens’ lack of voting rights as a
dismissal of the value of a vote. On the contrary, the DAO’s relatively strong
voice and exit rights are best understood as an acknowledgement of the power
of these tools to protect investors and constrain managers. As described above,
post-DAO tokens evolved without these rights in response to U.S. securities
laws. The example of the DAO (as well as the history of democratic and
corporate governance) points to their potency as a protective mechanism for the
crowd. It would be unwise to discount them.

time, some flex is needed to accommodate future uncertainty. Modifiability in traditional corporations is easily
handled by way of the certificate of incorporation (much as Part III.B.2 will suggest that supply limits are), so
this Article will not focus on promises of modifiability or lack thereof.
235
For an example, see Jentzsch, supra note 208.
236
Cohney, supra note 233, at 634.
237
Id. at 596, 639–40.
238
Id. at 615. The authors found that of the fifty largest ICOs of 2017 whose code they examined, thirtysix promised some type of vesting, but only eleven hard-coded it in the tokens’ smart contract. Id. at 634, 638.
239
DAO REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 223, at 15.
240
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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2. Limitation on Supply
At base, a security is the right to a share of the future profits of a project. As
a matter of basic math, the more securities an entity issues, the less value each
share will be worth. To use a time-worn but apt analogy, the more pieces into
which the pie is sliced, the smaller each piece becomes.
Corporate law hardwires a constraint on the number of shares that can be
issued in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation.241 The certificate lists the
authorized number of shares, and that number represents a ceiling on the number
of shares that can be issued—issuing more requires a board recommendation and
shareholder approval.242
Similarly, in an ICO the number of tokens in circulation directly affects the
value of each individual token.243 “The value of a token, like the value of a stock,
can be diluted through new issuance.”244 The blockchain itself must be coded to
prevent “wanton inflation of supply” in order to protect investors from
dilution.245 Given the theoretically limitless supply of cryptocurrency that can
be generated, it is unsurprising that “almost all issuers promise[d] a supply
restriction in their marketing documents.”246
What is notable for the purposes of financial contracting and innovation is
that this protection was so widespread. The risk of dilution is easy to
comprehend. The market responded uniformly to this potential threat with
contracting to constrain it.
3. Vesting/Compensation
Recall that, in the venture capital context, the concern was that a founder,
upon whose work rests the success of the venture, will shirk once he or she has
an ownership interest secured.247 Vesting is an elegant mechanism that ties the
founders’ efforts to the overall venture’s ultimate success.
241
Corporations remain the entity of choice for going public, although LLCs and other entities can
complete initial offerings as well. See Gregg D. Polsky & Adam H. Rosenzweig, The Up-C Revolution, 71 TAX
L. REV. 415, 415, 427 (2018) (discussing continued persistence of corporations).
242
See Karen Rogers, Difference Between Authorized & Outstanding Shares, AZCENTRAL, https://
yourbusiness.azcentral.com/difference-between-authorized-outstanding-shares-14977.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2019) (“Shareholders must approve any increase or decrease in the number of authorized shares through a
vote.”).
243
Cohney, supra note 233, at 612.
244
Id. at 613.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 637.
247
See supra Part II.B.3.
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ICOs also generally employed vesting in their financial contracts.248 These
locked up (or purported to lock up) portions of the founders’ tokens over a period
of time.249 Founders typically reserved a healthy portion of tokens for
themselves before an ICO. If founders could access these tokens immediately
after the ICO, the unscrupulous could promptly sell them on the secondary
market, pocket the proceeds, and abscond without ever delivering on the
promised technology. Instead, the code itself imposed constraints on when
founders could gain access to their token allocation.250 This “token vesting”
solves the problem of ICO founders taking the money, dumping the tokens on
the open market, and running.251 Cohney et al. quote Aragon’s CEO: “[V]esting
is a must. There are no excuses not to do it. It aligns everyone’s incentives and
ensures that no founder dumps happen.”252
It is worth noting, however, that vesting in the ICO context is a crude
phenomenon. There is rarely a performance component to “earning” the
tokens—instead, the passage of time alone is what causes a founder’s tokens to
vest.253 The agency cost that such vesting protects against is the fly-by-night
situation where a fraudulent promoter markets a new token, assigns herself a
percentage of the tokens as a founder’s share, and then hastily converts her
tokens into cash and exits stage right. This type of vesting does not prevent
founders from profiting from inaction—at most, it merely delays it. To be sure,
that delay in itself may deter the most egregious fraudsters and slackers. After
all, if a founder does not do enough work to further the project to make it at least
seem viable before vesting begins, she will be left holding vested tokens in a
worthless network. But, as an incentive-alignment tool, it pales in comparison
to the cliff-vesting of the venture world, where entrepreneurs face a real threat
248
Cohney et al., supra note 233, at 615. According to Cohney et al., ICOs “often” claim to code vesting
into their smart contracts. Id. In this study, Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff, and David
Wishnick conducted an empirical study of 2017 ICO smart contracts, revealing that not all vesting claims in
white papers manifest in the smart contracts of the offerings themselves. Id. at 638. ICOcheck.io includes, in its
evaluation criteria for ICOs, a vesting schedule defined as over two years vesting with a six-month cliff.
Background Checks and Due Diligence for Crypto Projects, ICOCHECK, https://icocheck.io/past.html (last
visited Aug. 13, 2018).
249
See supra note 248.
250
This was done through smart contracts. See supra note 248.
251
Commonly, every six months, a certain amount of tokens is released to the founders. This prevents
them from dumping the tokens post-ICO. Vedran Kajic, How To Protect ICO Investors: Auto-Refunds If
Milestones Aren’t Met, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 1, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/12/01/how-toprotect-ico-investors-auto-refunds-if-milestones-arent-met/.
252
Cohney et al., supra note 233, at 614 (quoting Luis Cuende, Aragon Network Token Sale Terms:
Founder Vesting, Simple Pricing and Distribution, ARAGON: ARAGON BLOG (Apr. 21, 2017), https://blog.
aragon.org/aragon-network-token-sale-terms-8998f63a3429/.
253
Id. at 628. Aragon purports to impose additional conditions on vesting, but these appear to be actualized
through a future token distribution. Id. at 628 n.185.
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of being fired and losing all claim to a firm’s equity if they do not perform well.
4. Threshold Raise
In a capital-raising campaign open to the general public that takes place over
the course of weeks or months, early investors risk being the first investors in an
offering that will draw only tepid support from the market as a whole. If a project
needs $5 million to succeed, they will be wary of committing their $1,000 until
they know the threshold goal is met, or close to being met, lest they be the
“sucker” that commits to a failed cause and loses money. In response, ICOs often
set a minimum amount to be raised as a condition to completing the offering.254
If an ICO fails at the funding stage, then the ICO’s terms usually provide that
the funds that were raised will be returned back to investors.255 This mechanism
encourages early supporters to contribute without risking being “suckers” who
lose the money they invest in a project that never gets off the ground.
For example, when an ICO by OnPlace failed to reach its minimum
fundraising goal, it posted instructions for investors on how to execute a smart
contract to retrieve the cryptocurrency they had invested.256 These instructions
were posted on Steemit, another social media and blogging website, as well as
their own website, and provided step-by-step instructions on how to use a smart
contract to withdraw the invested funds by executing a “safeWithdrawal”
function.257
Similarly, when Swapy, a blockchain technology focused on providing
universal credit access,258 failed to meet its fundraising goal through its ICO, it
254
For example, the DAO itself created a “minimum … [c]reation goal,” a minimum amount to be raised
in order for the offering to be successful. Jentzsch, supra note 208, at 2.
255
See, e.g., id. Kickstarter, a crowdfunding website, uses a similar “all or nothing” approach. What Are
the Basics?, KICKSTARTER, https://help.kickstarter.com/hc/en-us/articles/115005028514-What-are-the-basics
(last visited Oct. 27, 2019). When a project uses funds through Kickstarter, the creators set a minimum
fundraising goal, and no funds will be dispersed by Kickstarter to creators unless that minimum goal is reached.
Id. If the goal is not reached, Kickstarter refunds all the money raised. See id. In this sense, Kickstarter is
essentially acting as an escrow agent.
256
OnPlace ICO Fails to Reach Minimum Funds: Refund Your ETH Using Parity, STEEMIT,
https://steemit.com/ico/@kermee/onplace-ico-fails-to-reach-minimum-funds-refund-your-eth-using-parity (last
visited Oct. 27, 2019).
257
Id.; OnPlace Team, Refund Instruction, TELEGRAPH (July 6, 2017), https://telegra.ph/RefundInstruction-07-06. Since its failed ICO in July 2017, OnPlace has launched a pre-sale of tokens which met its
“soft-cap,” demonstrating that a failed fundraising effort is not the death of a project. See Natasha Mascarenhas,
OnPlace Resumes Pre-Sale, Soft Cap Reached, BLOCKCHAIN NEWS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.theblockchain.com/2018/02/20/onplace-resumes-pre-sale-soft-cap-reached/.
258
Swapy–Using Blockchain to Enable Easy Access to Credit and Affordable Loans, BITCOINIST (Mar.
12, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://bitcoinist.com/swapy-using-blockchain-enable-easy-access-credit-affordableloans/.
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announced the return of all investor funds through Medium (an online publishing
platform).259 Another failed project, BeOne, a decentralized education
platform,260 announced on Twitter that investors would be refunded when its
ICO did not raise enough money to continue.261 While it is hard to generalize,
these and other examples suggest refunding investors is the norm.262
It will not have escaped readers’ attention that current equity crowdfunding
rules already protect against the risk of failing to raise a minimum threshold
amount. Recall that equity crowdfunding similarly requires the return of
investment funds if the target amount is not reached.263 The borrowing of this
contractual protection from crowdfunding is, in effect, a market validation of
equity crowdfunding’s use of the target amount concept.264
5. Resale/liquidity
Although commentators do not focus much on this characteristic, most ICOs
sold tokens that were freely transferable on a secondary market.265 The market
for individual tokens could rise or fall, sometimes precipitously, but they could
be resold without limitation. This ability to resell quickly presents a type of
259
Edmilson Rodrigues, Swapy’s ICO Did Not Reach the Softcap. We Will Return the ETH to All
Contributors., MEDIUM (May 26, 2018), https://medium.com/swapynetwork/swapys-ico-did-not-reach-the-softcap-we-will-return-the-eth-to-all-contributors-6ffbd3b1e492. Swapy announced refunds through investors’
TGEApp profile within seven days after the end of the ICO, and, in an effort to fully refund investors, Swapy
also provided a form for those who no longer had access to the TGEApp they used to contribute. Edmilson
Rodrigues, Contributed and Don´t Have Access to the TGEApp Profile? Fill this Form., MEDIUM (June 1, 2018),
https://medium.com/swapynetwork/contributed-and-don-t-have-access-to-the-tgeapp-profile-fill-this-formada14f78388e.
260
BeOne—ICO Over, TOKEN MKT., https://tokenmarket.net/blockchain/waves/assets/beone/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019).
261
Be One (@beone_co), TWITTER (Oct. 7, 2017, 10:03 PM), https://twitter.com/beone_co/status/
916891688458752000.
262
See also Spheris, Spheris Crowdsale Refund Instructions, COINSPECTATOR, https://coinspectator.com/
news/93554/spheris-crowdsale-refund-instructions (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (providing refund instructions
for Spheris, a failed ICO); InChain ICO Fails, Investors To Be Reimbursed, FORKLOG (Nov. 24, 2016),
http://forklog.media/inchain-ico-fails-investors-to-be-reimbursed/ (noting that InChain refunded investors after
failing to meet fundraising goals); DIGI TOKEN, https://www.digitoken.tech (last visited June 19, 2018)
(announcing a refund for all investors on website).
263
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
264
It is likely that equity crowdfunding borrowed this concept from Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and other
offerings that require a certain amount to “make.” Joan MacLeod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the
Block: Funding Portals Under the CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 177, 192 (2013) (“[T]he ‘target
offering amount’ … appears to be an obvious reference to a pre-statutory crowdfunding norm. In the preCROWDFUND Act era, the distribution of funds to a business or project in a crowdfunded offering typically
was contingent on the attainment of a certain threshold level of funding.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7)
(2012))).
265
How to Buy ICO Tokens: Beginner’s Guide, COINTELEGRAPH, https://cointelegraph.com/ico-101/howto-buy-ico-tokens-beginners-guide (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
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protection not afforded to venture investors, who face contractual limits to
resale, as well as legal limitations running from six months to two years, as we
have seen.266 Even if a venture investor held onto the shares for the requisite
amount of time, and had bargained for the contractual right to resell, she would
face practical difficulties in finding a buyer willing to purchase such a relatively
illiquid security.
This survey of the key contractual mechanisms governing ICOs suggests that
ICO developers used financial contracting to help protect investors and mitigate
risk, just as their counterparts in venture finance do. Some of those contractual
mechanisms, such as limits on supply, are not as useful in the equity
crowdfunding context because the articles of incorporation form an easy
mechanism to prevent dilution in organizations not based on the blockchain. But
vesting, voice, and exit hold more promise. At least, they are examples of
mechanisms that could apply to crowdfunding. Indeed, equity crowdfunding
already employs a threshold amount, and the ICO market validates its usefulness
as an investor protection device. But before extrapolating any lessons from the
ICO market, it is time to deal with some objections.
C. Caveats
Readers may well be skeptical of the idea of applying the lessons of ICOs to
equity crowdfunding. It may be that ICOs do not represent a particularly good
model from which to extrapolate. This Section will deal with three criticisms.
The first objection is that ICOs were nothing more than a bubble. There is
nothing of value to be gained from examining the financial contracts of ICOs,
because they were the product of an irrationality, not rational investor choice.
The second objection is that the general public should not, as a matter of policy,
invest in risky private ventures. The third objection, at least as it pertains to using
venture capital financial contracting as a model, is that the lack of a venture
capitalist constitutes a major differentiator for ICOs and equity crowdfunding
alike.
First, cryptocurrency in general, and ICOs in particular, can fairly be
characterized as a bubble, defined as a “rapid run-up [in prices] followed by a

266

See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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crash.”267 Hysteria began in 2016 and peaked in late 2017.268 Bitcoin traded at
$20,000 on December 17, 2017; in late 2018 it traded at $3,525.05.269 Indeed,
commentators, both at the time and since then, have described a kind of cryptohysteria based on ephemera and rampant speculation.270 While the underlying
blockchain technology makes it difficult to know who was investing in
cryptocurrency and ICOs, it is clear that some percentage of the unsophisticated
and unwary, who did not understand the technology, or even what an ICO was,
lost money investing in ICOs.271 Seen in this light, one logical concern is that it
would be unwise to look to these contracts for guideposts in financial contracting
with the crowd.
The first response to this objection is a pragmatic one. Because of the nature
of securities law and the state’s regulatory choke hold, as described in Part II.C,
ICOs are all we have as evidence of the terms the crowd might want. It may be
that these investments were based not on the terms of the financial contracts as
described in the white papers, but on hype alone. On this view, if no one was
pausing to evaluate those terms, then any terms would have sufficed. Cohney’s
finding of coding errors certainly suggests a lack of diligence on the part of the
crowd.
Yet these promises clearly mattered. The terms converged around a few key
protections—threshold raises, supply limits, and vesting. And ICOs did not fail

267
Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage Regulation Can
Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—from Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 1551 (2015). There is no
consensus on the definition of a bubble. Other descriptions include “marketwide irrational exuberance,” Id. at
1608; “the irrational characteristic of asset-price bubbles: the unfounded belief that downside risk—in that case,
the risk of home prices plummeting—will never be realized,” Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and PostCrisis Financial Regulation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 115, 126 (2016); “boom-and-bust price behavior,”
John Patrick Hunt, Taking Bubbles Seriously in Contract Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 705 (2011); and
“high volumes of speculative trading,” Id.
268
Sam Ouimet, Down More than 70% in 2018, Bitcoin Closes Its Worst Year on Record, COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/down-more-than-70-in-2018-bitcoin-closes-its-worst-year-on-record (last updated
Jan. 2, 2019, 3:32 PM); Julie Myers Wood, Regulators Are Catching Up with the Crypto Boom, FORBES (Sept.
27, 2018, 10:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/juliemyerswood/2018/09/27/regulators-are-catching-upwith-the-crypto-boom/#14f2731e1b92.
269
Nigel Chiwaya, Bitcoin Reached an All-Time High Last Year. Now, You Might Be Digging for Coal.,
NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/markets/bitcoin-high-2017-decline-2018-data-n949576 (last
updated Dec. 19, 2018, 11:07 AM).
270
See Jon Evans, The Cryptocurrency Bubble Is Strangling Innovation, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 7, 2018, 9:00
AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/07/the-cryptocurrency-bubble-is-strangling-innovation/; Kevin Roose, Is
There a Cryptocurrency Bubble? Just Ask Doge., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/15/business/cryptocurrency-bubble-doge.html.
271
See Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
487, 516 (2018) (highlighting the difficulty of the technical and hardware requirements).
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to deliver on all promises.272 Given the dearth of competent developers273 and
the difficulties even billion-dollar companies have with hacking and bugs, these
may be sins of omission rather than commission, borne of haste rather than
fraudulent intent. Indeed, in the face of such lightning-fast capital raises,274 the
fact that entrepreneurs continued to feel they had to offer these contractual
limitations speaks to their importance.
The second response to the bubble criticism, equally as pragmatic, cautions
against overstating the safety of the public markets. Two paradigmatic examples
of the 2001 Internet stock bubble are Enron and Pets.com.275 The stock of both
companies were high-fliers in the public markets around the late 1990s and early
2000s, and both ended in bankruptcy, costing investors millions of dollars in
losses.276 Investors’ losses in Enron were the product of fraud, and those in
Pets.com mere folly, but both serve as a stark reminder that the crowd can easily
lose its shirt in the public markets—or, for that matter, in a casino.277
Another objection might be that public and private investors are
fundamentally different. Accredited investors and institutional investors may be
more sophisticated than average Joe investors (although there is plenty of
evidence otherwise).278 Even if not any savvier, at least wealthy investors can
better afford to lose money in risky investments than the crowd can.279 As a
society, we can allow the affluent the freedom to experiment in private markets,
relying only on financial contracting to protect themselves. The general public
is a more vulnerable population. The elderly, the ignorant, and the unwary may
be seduced by the unscrupulous—and these individuals have much more to lose
precisely because they have much less to lose. Society should protect them from
such risks—even at the risk of paternalism.
272
See Cohney et al., supra note 233, at 637 (noting that 75% of ICOs that promised a supply restriction
delivered it).
273
Sherman Lee, The Demand for Blockchain Engineers Is Skyrocketing, but Blockchain Itself Is
Redefining How They’re Employed, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
shermanlee/2018/04/11/the-demand-for-blockchain-engineers-is-skyrocketing-but-blockchain-itself-isredefining-how-theyre-employed/#35af5f616715.
274
SingularityNet reportedly raised $36 million in cryptocurrency in less than a minute. JD Alois, Fastest
ICO Ever? SingularityNet Raises $36 Million in 60 Seconds, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Dec. 22, 2017, 7:28 PM),
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/12/126315-fastest-ico-ever-singularitynet-raises-36-million-60seconds/. To be fair, they had a two-stage process to comply with anti-money laundering and know-yourcustomer laws. Id.
275
See Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
43, 48, 50 (2005).
276
See id. at 48, 50, 52.
277
Rodrigues, supra note 17, at 3428.
278
Id. at 3423–24.
279
Id. at 3424.
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This is, at heart, a policy question. As Part II described, traditionally the
wealthy had access to riskier, and potentially more profitable, investments, but
those investments were limited as to amount and resale, were not advertised to
the general public, and effectively could not grow beyond 500 shareholders.
Congress has loosened these restrictions. The public is well aware that private
fortunes have been made on behemoths like Uber and Airbnb, in which they
could not invest while private. On the flip side, equity crowdfunding is currently
letting the crowd invest in private companies, but crowdfunding appears to be
the resort of those firms that cannot get financing elsewhere.
The third objection is that venture capital financial contracting has an
obvious element that neither ICOs nor crowdfunding does: a venture capitalist.
When a venture capital fund invests in a company, generally one of the fund’s
directors sits on the board of that company. Thus, the control rights, exit rights,
and redemption rights are focused in an individual representing a small group of
individuals minding the till. Equity crowdfunding, as currently conceived, lacks
this centralized, motivated monitor. Without that, focused control rights and
protections may not mean much.
This objection goes to the heart of the concerns about public capital raising.
The public markets substitute disclosure for robust contractual control rights,
and trust that the market as a whole—perhaps led by sophisticated investors such
as hedge funds and pension funds—can adequately monitor. Mechanisms like
vesting and a threshold raise can work without supervision, but venture capital
couples these with representation on the board and veto rights at both board and
shareholder level. That venture capitalist presence on the board represents a
watchful eye looking over the shoulder of a start-up and exercising both soft and
hard power when necessary. The crowd context, whether ICO or crowdfunding,
lacks that active oversight.
This criticism goes to the crux of the question of to what extent private
financial contracting can apply in the public setting—and how much the venture
capitalist presence, separate and apart from high-powered incentives like
vesting, contribute to a venture-backed company’s success. At some level, of
course, the crowd will never be able to exert the same sort of concentrated
monitoring that a venture fund does.
However, crowdfunding could look to the governance structure of venture
funds themselves for an alternative approach. Venture funds sometimes have a
committee of investors that provide a check on the fund’s managers.280 This
280

See Alexander J. Davie, Managing Conflicts of Interest in Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds,
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check, to be sure, is quite weak, and it is generally understood that high-powered
incentives (the return the fund’s managers will earn on the fund’s profit, taxed
at a beneficial capital gains rate),281 and the reputation the managers want to
cultivate in order to raise future funds, do much of the work of governance at the
fund level.282 Crowdfunding could profitably explore such innovative
governance structures—if it were allowed to do so.
Yet crowdfunding, as currently conceived, is a meager half loaf that both
fails to address the capital raising needs of entrepreneurs and fails to allow the
crowd a meaningful way to invest in private firms. Given concerns about income
inequality and wealth disparity, crowdfunding has the potential to be a force to
democratize capital. Currently, it is not fulfilling that potential.
Both venture capital and ICOs address the risks of uncertainty, asymmetric
information, and agency costs, often with similar mechanisms. That fact alone
suggests that we should consider importing these protections to equity
crowdfunding.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Crowdfunding is broken. Its rules are too complicated, and it limits firms to
only $1.07 million in capital raising over a twelve-month period.283 The next
Part will articulate the contours of a solution, informed by the features of ICOs
and VC financial contracting that Parts III and IV described. To implement this
solution, ideally Congress would create a tailored exemption from registration
under the Securities Act that balances investor protection with the new
opportunities for capital raising, fostering a robust market that creates a level
playing field, benefiting investors and issuers alike. Unfortunately,
congressional action is unlikely. Congress sometimes legislates in the securities
law area, but it does so relatively rarely.284 If Congress were to intervene,
however, financial contracting suggests following certain insights from VCs and
STRICTLY BUS. (May 24, 2017), https://www.strictlybusinesslawblog.com/2017/05/24/managing-conflictsinterest-private-equity-venture-capital-funds/ (discussing usefulness in dealing with conflicts of interest and
noting that the “fund’s limited partnership agreement establishes the existence and authority of the limited
partner advisory committee”).
281
See Chris Isidore & Jill Disis, Tax Break for Hedge Fund Managers Mostly Survives in GOP Bill, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 21, 2017, 2:53 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/21/news/trump-carried-interest-taxplan/index.html (discussing favorable tax treatment).
282
See Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 131, 135–36 (noting
that the return to managers on fund’s profit incentivizes investment success).
283
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
284
See generally Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435
(2017) (examining when Congress chooses to legislate in the area of securities law).
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ICOs. For now, this Part presumes such an exemption to be politically feasible
and explores what form it might take.
A. Threshold Raise and the Power of Escrow
As Parts II.C and IV.B.4 described, both ICOs and current crowdfunding
rules employ a threshold raise concept, termed a “target amount” in
crowdfunding parlance. The ICO experience teaches that this concept, which
likely has its origins in pre-equity crowdfunding norms,285 is a valuable investor
protection for the crowd. Keep in mind, crowdfunding differs from the venture
context, where, at most, a handful of venture funds will collectively finance a
fundraising round, and the closing will occur in a single day. Given that
crowdfunding, in contrast, unfolds over a period of weeks or even months,
setting a threshold amount to raise makes good sense.
The threshold raise also conveniently introduces an escrow mechanism to
crowdfunding. As discussed in Part II.C, the crowdfunding rules require that the
crowdfunding intermediary be a registered broker-dealer or a funding portal that
uses a qualified third party to hold the funds for the benefit of the investors.286
Qualified parties are defined as a registered broker or dealer, or a bank or credit
union “that has agreed in writing either to hold the funds in escrow …, or to
maintain a bank or credit union account … for the exclusive benefit of investors
and the issuer.”287 Once the target amount and other requisite conditions have
been met, then the funding portal directs the funds to be released from escrow.
This simple concept of an escrow is a powerful one, as we will see. By
allowing for funds to be securely amassed, but not dispersed, it can
simultaneously reassure the entrepreneur that funds are available, while at the
same time leaving the investors with some strings to pull. Notably, before the
enactment of the Securities Act, certain states imposed escrow requirements on
offerors. Florida’s blue sky law, for example, required an “escrow agreement
with a bank, trust company, or an attorney-at-law, setting forth the price per
share, the total amount of stock to be issued and the total funds to be obtained
from the sale, and the date the sale is to be concluded.”288 The funds were then
to be deposited with an escrow agent, and if they were not deposited with the
“escrowee within the time prescribed in the escrow agreement, which shall be
for not more than six months, then the escrowee shall return all funds held to the
285
286
287
288

Heminway, supra note 264, at 192.
17 C.F.R. § 227.303(e) (2017).
Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.06(10) (West 1971) (repealed 1978).
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respective subscribers.”289 In Arizona, an administrator was allowed to “hold the
stock of promoters in escrow as a condition of registration,” and the capital
would not be released until a petitioner provided at least one year of satisfactory
earnings.290 Thus, although the Securities Act’s move to put deep-pocketed
investment banks on the hook for fraud in registered companies’ offerings may
have obviated the need for escrows in 1933, the escrow’s power to delay funding
has historical antecedents.
Promisingly, escrow figures prominently as a protective feature in one area
where the SEC has allowed experimentation in raising funds from the general
public—the special purpose acquisition company (SPAC).291 The promoters of
a SPAC take an entity public that is a mere shell corporation.292 Because the
corporation is just a fundraising vehicle, liabilities are nearly nonexistent, and
disclosures are limited to biographies of the management team and a description
of what the team is looking for in an acquisition target (industry, etc.). Once the
funds are raised, the team launches a time-limited search for an acquisition
target.293 Once the managers find a target, SPAC investors typically have a preacquisition vote as to whether to get their money back, or to approve the
acquisition and remain as shareholders of the now-public firm.294 In this manner,
like entrepreneurs seeking venture capital, or crowdfunding entrepreneurs
seeking money from the general public, SPAC promoters turned to financial
contracting to raise money from the general public for future events.
SPACs thus addressed the familiar problem of how to raise money for a yetto-be determined future enterprise, with a key difference from the funding
models we have explored thus far. Where both venture financing and ICOs
contemplated raising funds in order to build a business or grow a business,
SPACs ducked the problem of judging how the venture was progressing by
raising money for a future acquisition of an existing business. The SPAC form
relied on escrow to offer its investors protection.
SPACs characteristically agree to hold 90% or more of the offering proceeds

289

Id.
Marianne M. Jennings, Bruce K. Childers & Ronald J. Kudla, Federalism to an Advantage: The Demise
of State Blue Sky Laws Under the Uniform Securities Act, 19 AKRON L. REV. 395, 400 n.34 (1986).
291
See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 743, 756–59 (2008) (discussing SPACs).
292
Id. at 756.
293
Id. Sjostrom describes SPACs as a species of reverse mergers, and at a high level of generality. See id.
at 744, 756. In contrast, this Article conducts an empirical analysis of individual characteristics of SPACs and
documents how they change over time.
294
See id. at 758.
290

RODRIGUESPROOFS_12.5.19

2019]

FINANCIAL CONTRACTING WITH THE CROWD

12/9/2019 11:37 AM

443

in escrow.295 “[T]he trust is held at a custodian independent of the SPAC … and
is monitored by a third-party trust company, making the value of the trust
account extremely safe.”296 The key question, then, becomes what should trigger
the release of the escrowed funds. As in the venture space, SPACs turned to
voice and exit as investor protections, voice being the aforementioned vote, and
exit being the right of investors to get their money back. The Sections below will
explore the potential for these mechanisms as protections for the general public
in the crowdfunding context.
B. Exit, Voice, and Staged Financing
Albert Hirschman identified exit and voice as two mechanisms that
discipline organizations.297 As we have seen, staged financing and voting
control, coupled with a theoretical redemption right, are potent investor
protection mechanisms venture capitalists deploy to protect against the common
problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. A robust
escrow could enable crowdfunding to offer the general public a version of the
same kinds of protections.
First, a word of explanation. This Section will describe exit as a redemption
right, that is, a right for the investor to get either all or a portion of her money
back from the firm. The liquidity that comes with the right to sell on the
secondary market can function as a separate investor protection, as discussed
below.
Recall the basic problems confronting the investor: uncertainty as to what
will happen, asymmetric information as compared to the entrepreneur, and fear
that the entrepreneur will shirk or steal.298 Staged financing is part of what solves
this problem in venture finance by dividing the funding commitment into
stages.299 An escrow would allow a similar function in the crowdfunding
context. Say a firm is looking to raise $10 million to develop a remote, phoneoperated video doorbell.300 The crowdfunding offering documents could
295
Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 155, at 913. These funds must be invested in government
obligations or treasury securities. Id.; Douglas S. Ellenoff, Trusting SPACs During Difficult Times, EQUITIES
MAG., Dec. 2008, at 30, 30.
296
Christopher Raby, Sourcing SPAC Returns, DET. LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), http://www.legalnews.
com/Detroit/1464013.
297
See Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1349 (2013) (discussing
Hirschman’s ideas in context of minorities in a democracy).
298
See supra Part II.A.
299
See supra Part II.B.1.
300
SkyBell, a video doorbell company, raised $600,000 on Indiegogo to fund its business. Murray
Newlands, This IoT Product Crowdfunded $600K and Is Now Worth Millions: Here’s How, FORBES (Feb. 24,
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articulate specific milestones. For example, perhaps it would take $3 million to
develop a prototype, $3 million more to launch in a few test markets, and $4
million more to roll out nationwide. The company could raise the full $10
million but keep $7 million in escrow. If and when the prototype is finished (on
or ahead of schedule), investors can vote on whether to release the next $3
million for the test launch.
This vote brings us to the question of voice, or control. It is true that the ICO
market reacted to the SEC’s DAO report by stripping voting power from ICOs,
but I do not think that alone is enough to reject the potential for voting as a
powerful protective mechanism. As described above, the elimination of the vote
to create so-called utility ICOs in the post-DAO report context is best understood
as an attempt to evade the Howey test,301 rather than as a natural evolution of the
market.
A right to vote is common in typical securities (and in democratic
government): Corporate shareholders typically vote on a slate of directors that
oversee the corporation, and crowdfunding investors could certainly vote on
management in a like manner. Shareholders also vote on fundamental changes
in a corporation’s life, including amendments to its organizing documents,
mergers, and dissolution. But voting can wield an even stronger discipline when
paired with staged financing, because it gives shareholders a right to extend or
withhold financing at a future point in time. Used in conjunction with staged
financing, and powered by the security of escrowed funds, it allows the crowd
in essence an option on the future prospects of the venture.
The question next becomes what to do with the escrowed funds if individual
shareholders, or the majority of crowdfunding shareholders, vote against
continuing with the project. This brings us to exit—and a cautionary tale. Recall
the redemption rights venture capitalists sometimes bargain for, but rarely
use.302 SPACs, in contrast, offer strong exit rights, which are often used.303 Early
SPACs coupled this exit right with robust voting rights—shareholders had a vote
on an acquisition, coupled with a right to receive their pro rata share of the
2017, 7:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mnewlands/2017/02/24/this-iot-product-crowdfunded-600kand-is-now-worth-millions-heres-how/#5bc17312460f; Ryan Robinson, 5 Crowdfunded Side Projects that
Became Million-Dollar Companies, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ryanrobinson/2017/09/18/crowdfunded-side-projects-that-became-million-dollar-companies/#574ad86d3f1d.
301
See Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin
Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 950 (2018) (“One result of the SEC’s report has been a deluge of articles
drawing a distinction between so-called equity tokens, like those the SEC contends The DAO issued, and socalled ‘utility’ tokens.”).
302
See supra Part II.B.4.
303
See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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escrowed funds if they opposed the merger.304 This exit functioned as a
secondary veto, because if enough shareholders exercised their redemption
rights, the merger would not go forward.305
Keep in mind, however, these protective voting mechanisms introduce costs
of their own. For a time after the 2008 crisis, there was evidence that SPAC
investors were voting down deals not on the merits, but instead because the cash
promised if the fund were to liquidate was more valuable, in a world of
widespread illiquidity, than tying up assets in an acquisition.306 So, while these
shareholder approval provisions helped convince the SEC to allow the first
experiments in SPAC offerings to proceed, they created an unintended holdout
right.307 Ultimately, giving SPAC shareholders a vote introduced more trouble
than it was worth.308 More recently, the SEC has allowed SPACs to go forward
with fewer votes—relying on exit and liquidity to protect investors.309
This story will resonate for readers familiar with appraisal rights and
appraisal litigation. Corporate law typically gives shareholders appraisal rights
in mergers, allowing them to dissent and petition the court for the fair value of
their shares.310 The rise of “appraisal arbitrage,” where hedge funds bought
shares of companies after a merger’s announcement solely to dissent and sue,
led to an uptick in lawsuits.311 Delaware has moved to curtail these rights, but
they do sound a cautionary note.312
The power of investors to exit, and get all, or a portion of, their money back
from the firm, is a formidable protective device. In fact, Professors John Morley
and Quinn Curtis suggested that voting in mutual funds may be a less reliable
constraint on agency costs because exit—true exit, that is, the redemption of
assets rather than the sale of a claim on the assets—is so cheap.313 To apply this
insight to our crowdfunding example, if a crowdfunding investor sours on the
304
305

See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 155, at 910. Early SPACs put this “conversion threshold” at 20%.

Id.
306
See Christie Smythe, Conflicting Interests Put SPAC Mergers in Limbo, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2009, 1:54
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/118397/conflicting-interests-put-spac-mergers-in-limbo (“As an
aftereffect of the recession, many SPAC investors would rather get money back than see a deal get done….”).
307
Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 155, at 910.
308
Id. at 912.
309
Id. at 856.
310
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2019).
311
Jetley & Ji, supra note 170, at 428.
312
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation:
Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 BUS. LAW. 961, 962 (2018).
313
John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t
Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 89 (2010).
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video doorbell after the prototype stage, she could receive back $0.70 of every
dollar she had invested. If so many investors redeemed their shares that less than
$3 million was left for the next stage of the venture, then everyone would receive
their money back.
In evaluating the benefits of voice versus exit, it is wise to be mindful of the
lessons of SPACs and appraisal in Delaware: Any time an organization
introduces a vote, it risks opportunistic voting behavior. Articulating the proper
balance between voice and exit rights, which guard against firm opportunism
but create a concomitant risk of investor opportunism, is ultimately beyond the
scope of this Article.314 As was the case with SPACs, the market itself is
probably the best guide.
C. Vesting
The venture contract requires founders’ shares to vest over time as a matter
of course. This provision mitigates the risk of agency cost by tying the founder’s
success to the ultimate success of the business. Because most of the founder’s
compensation is equity based, if she shirks, she risks losing not only her job, but
also her stake in the business. The ICO market replicated the vesting mechanism,
although with mere passage of time as the vesting condition.
These two experiences suggest that imposing a vesting schedule serves an
important role in protecting investors. Requiring that the founders’ shares vest
over time does not appear widespread in crowdfunding.315 It would be relatively
easy for Congress to impose the standard four-year cliff-vesting schedule on its
executive officers as a condition of availing itself of a new crowdfunding
exemption. As importantly, it is a clear contractual provision, the existence of
which would be easy for the SEC or funding portals to verify. Coupled with an
escrow-driven milestone timeline, vesting has the potential to echo in the
crowdfunding context a mechanism that has been a powerful motivational tool
in the venture capital space.
D. Liquidity/Resale
Resale, the ability of a dissatisfied owner to sell their shares, can serve as a
disciplining force on corporations. In theory, the market for corporate control
314
This discussion suggests that negative covenants, a potent tool in the venture setting, might similarly
pose too high a risk of investor opportunism.
315
Jeff Thomas, Equity Crowdfunding Portals Should Join and Enhance the Crowd by Providing Venture
Formation Resources, 42 NOVA L. REV. 375, 397–98 (2018) (stating crowdfunding issuers “are less likely to
use” vesting provisions because there are no venture capitalists to demand them).
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constrains corporate management because, as a failing corporation loses value,
it becomes ripe for takeover by more able managers.316 While this mechanism is
powerful over time, it unfortunately punishes the investor, who must sell a
devalued asset to express her displeasure. Thus, in a traditional public
corporation, the resale right is cold comfort because it usually means selling at
a loss. Given this harsh fact, the redemption right discussed above is a more
powerful protective mechanism for the crowd.
The question remains whether a right of resale would be a useful secondary
protection for crowdfunding investors. Looking to our analogs, the power to
resell traditionally was not one that venture capitalists relied upon. Increasingly,
however, particularly as firms like Uber developed high valuations before going
public, secondary sales are becoming more common (although still constrained
by statutory restrictions of at least six months).317 SPAC developers, in contrast,
purposefully planned for the stock to trade on the secondary markets as soon as
the SPAC went public. 318 ICOs likewise offered free resale, without the built-in
protection that the escrowed funds provided SPACs.319 The ability of free resale
clearly contributed to the speculative frenzy that took over the ICO market at its
height.320
As is the case with other private securities, current crowdfunding rules
restrict resale to non-accredited investors for a year.321 On balance, this seems a
sensible restriction, despite the risk it poses to investors. Allowing free resale
might create a vibrant secondary market, thus offering some protection to
investors. But it would also expose more investors to the heightened risks that
equity crowdfunding presents. The one-year resale restriction should encourage
potential crowdfunding investors to do their due diligence and assess the issuer
before investing. This beneficial incentive to “look before you leap,” hopefully
will diminish the kind of frenzy that surrounded ICOs.

316
The concentration of power in the hands of founders that has proved so popular in Silicon Valley
weakens the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control.
317
See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in
Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2013) (observing rise in “nonexchange
trading markets” to facilitate these transactions).
318
Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 155, at 877. SPACs deliberately modeled their features on blank
check companies that proceeded them, which were heavily regulated by the SEC, but included this key
distinction that SPAC shares were freely tradable. Id. at 875, 877.
319
See supra Part III.B.5.
320
Cf. supra Part I.C.
321
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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E. Raising Crowdfunding Limits
As described in Part II.C, current equity crowdfunding can fairly be
characterized as a market for lemons. Joseph Green and John Coyle made the
following observations:
[Because of] the additional costs and disclosures required of
crowdfunding issuers, most startups that have access to traditional
forms of startup fundraising will be loath to undertake a crowdfunding
offering. As a result, many of the startups that choose to pursue
crowdfunding as a means of raising capital do so because they have no
other options, and they may still struggle to raise traditional venture
financing down the road.322

But the SEC has allowed experimentation in one area of crowdfunding—and the
results of this experimentation suggest that equity crowdfunding may in fact be
a market for lemons, attractive mostly to those too unsophisticated to understand
their investments. Early crowdfunding studies suggest the popularity of Simple
Agreements for Future Equity (SAFEs) as offerings.323 SAFEs are a relatively
recent innovation in venture financing, developed by Y Combinator as a means
for extremely early-stage companies to secure funding cheaply and quickly.324
SAFEs are neither equity nor debt—they basically give their holder the option
to buy equity in a firm at an advantageous price should it continue to grow to a
point where it can obtain venture financing in the future, be acquired, or go
public.325 Importantly, these triggering events are common in venture finance,
but may be quite rare in “non-tech offerings like the craft brewery or local
bakery.”326 The hapless SAFE holder in such instances would be left with a
worthless security, because no trigger event would ever occur that would allow
her to convert her SAFE into a share of the business.327 To add insult to injury,
some SAFEs allow the company to redeem them for the purchase price at the
company’s option—presumably to be exercised just when conversion would be
most valuable.328
Green and Coyle observe that SAFEs are “highly company-favorable,”329
322
Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe Safe, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
168, 175 (2016).
323
Studies suggest 26% of crowdfunding offerings involve SAFEs. FSLR NO. 2766, supra note 125, at
12.
324
Green & Coyle, supra note 322, at 172.
325
Id.
326
FSLR NO. 2766, supra note 125, at 12–13.
327
Green & Coyle, supra note 322, at 177–78.
328
Id. at 178–79.
329
Id. at 173.
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and really only make sense in the binary world of early-stage tech startups,
which will either experience explosive growth, or flame out quickly.330 Green
and Coyle recommend that the SEC rethink its “laissez-faire approach” and
require that crowdfunders issue investors debt, preferred equity, or common
equity.331 The SEC later issued an investor bulletin titled Be Cautious of SAFEs
in Crowdfunding.332
More fundamentally, the presence of SAFE offerings in equity
crowdfunding suggests that today’s crowdfunding regime is unworkable. The
combination of the stiflingly low $1.07 million cap333 on raising funds and the
burdensome disclosure regime334 means that seeking traditional debt or equity
does not make financial sense for firms. SAFEs may be attractive precisely
because they allow non-tech firms to raise money without giving much of
anything to investors in return.
Also problematic is the limited amount that any investor can invest in
crowdfunding ventures, per year, if those small amounts do not incentivize much
diligence on the part of particular investors.335 Implementing financial
contracting safeguards like the ones suggested above may give legislators the
comfort to raise crowdfunding limits considerably. This simple move, already
championed by Representative McHenry,336 has the potential to lower the cost
of capital for crowdfunding dramatically, so long as neither the SEC nor
Congress imposes new requirements on issuers who seek to raise more money.
The same disclosure requirements that seem too burdensome to raise $1 million
may well be worth it for $3 million or $5 million.
V. IMPLEMENTING THESE MECHANISMS WITHIN THE CURRENT
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The previous Part evaluated how financial contracting could help protect
crowdfunding investors if Congress chose to intervene in securities laws. But
Congress only rarely makes securities laws—generally, it does so in two
330

Id. at 172–73.
Id. at 180–82.
332
Office of Inv’r Educ. & Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: Be Cautious of SAFEs in Crowdfunding, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_safes (last updated
Sept. 18, 2019).
333
17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2018).
334
See id. § 227.201.
335
See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The counterargument is that an investment of 5–10% of an
investor’s net worth is enough to make any investor investigate the issuer seriously. See supra note 115 and
accompanying text.
336
See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
331
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settings. The first is in response to a crisis, when it delegates much of the actual
regulation to the SEC.337 The second is in response to lobbying from special
interest groups, who generally tend to be sophisticated, moneyed, and successful
in having their policy preferences enshrined in law, as opposed to being
delegated to agency rulemaking.338 This binary is not absolute—crowdfunding,
which lacked these sophisticated backers and delegated many details to the SEC,
made its way into the JOBS Act by being swept into a larger deregulatory agenda
championed by Silicon Valley.339 Reform may be feasible if crowdfunding
boosters can similarly fold it into larger “JOBS 3.0” style legislation, and bill it
as a path to democratizing capital.
Still, given historical trends and the current political landscape, this Part
moves from hypotheticals to reality, and presumes there will be little impetus to
“fix crowdfunding” on Capitol Hill. Reality, in this case, means finding a noncrowdfunding exemption from the IPO registration requirement.
Noteworthy is the fact that there are two potential regulators at play: the SEC
at the federal level, and the individual state securities regulators. Because
crowdsourcing usually involves interstate commerce, the regulation could be
enacted at the federal level.340 But states also have jurisdiction to regulate, unless
Congress has preempted state regulation by asserting an intention that its
regulation will supersede, rather than complement, state regulation.341 Thus, the
intrastate exemption remains a viable possibility, as discussed below.
With each of the methods discussed below, the SEC could engage in formal
rulemaking, where the SEC meets with industry groups and other stakeholders,
conducts research, proposes rules, and opens them up for public notice and
comment.342 It then takes the comments back, studies and analyzes further, and
eventually promulgates final rules.343 This is always a lengthy process and
explains why crowdfunding only became a reality three and a half years after
the JOBS Act of 2012 directed the SEC to develop crowdfunding rules.344 With
337

Rodrigues, supra note 284, at 449.
Id.
339
Id. at 496.
340
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–53 (1995) (explaining that the U.S. Constitution gives
the federal government the power to regulate interstate commerce).
341
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–41 (2001) (explaining that the Supremacy
Clause allows Congress to preempt state action).
342
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012) (detailing the formal rulemaking process).
343
Id. § 553(c).
344
The JOBS Act was enacted in 2012 and the SEC rules were promulgated in 2015. See Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 315–16 (2012) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77d-1 (2012)); 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (2018).
338
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those preliminaries out of the way, I explore below three ways the SEC might
be able to allow enhanced equity crowdfunding to go forward within existing
exemptions.
A. Reg A+
Reg A+, sometimes called a “mini-IPO,” enables general solicitation and
sale to the general public.345 What’s more, it allows promoters to raise
substantial sums in a twelve-month period.346 The Reg A+ exemption
differentiates offerings up to $20 million, which require relatively fewer
disclosures, from offerings from $20 to $50 million, which have additional
disclosure and reporting requirements.347 These larger offerings permit general
solicitation and impose no restrictions on resale.348
The problem is that raising the funds in this manner requires a threshold
spend of hundreds of thousands of dollars. This is because Reg A+ requires that
offerors both make an electronic filing and provide to investors an offering
statement that includes risk factors, dilution, plan of distribution and selling
securities holders, description of business and property, and other matters.349
These filings take time and cost money, often in the $200,000–225,000 range.350
After the initial sale, offerors are required to file periodic disclosures on these
subjects.351 Crowdfunding firms must look to another source for the money to
pay for the disclosure process. Certainly, they can turn to bank loans or angel or
VC investors, but if those funding methods were feasible, the issuer would likely
have employed them to raise funding in the first place.
The financial contracting mechanisms described above could provide a
solution. The JOBS Act provides that the “[t]he issuer may solicit interest in the
345

Shadab, supra note 109, at 367.
Tier 1 allows offerings of securities up to $20 million in a twelve-month period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251.
Although Tier 1 offerings do not preempt state Blue Sky laws, they have fewer reporting requirements than Tier
2 offerings. Id. § 230.257; see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the
JOBS Act, 66 DUKE L.J. 605, 617 n.63 (2016) (“The Commission’s regulatory preemption in its Regulation A+
rules is modest, however, only preempting state authority over Tier 2 offerings and leaving Tier 1 offerings …
subject to state registration authority.”).
347
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251, 230.257; Regulation A, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.
gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/rega (last updated Sept. 18, 2019).
348
Overview of Exemptions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/
exemptofferings/exemptofferingschart (last updated Feb. 12, 2019).
349
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Form 1-A Regulation Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933,
https://www.sec.gov/files/form1-a.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
350
See KNYAZEVA, supra note 112, at 13–14 (showing that the median cost of a Reg A+ filing is
approximately $205,000).
351
17 C.F.R. § 230.257.
346
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offering prior to filing any offering statement, on such terms and conditions as
the Commission may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.”352 Congress then directed the SEC to require Reg A+ issuers to file
audited financial statements annually, and to impose whatever other conditions
the SEC deemed “necessary in the public interest and for the protection of
investors.”353
The SEC could allow issuers to solicit interest in the offering by describing
a project, and then allow a limited offering that escrows almost the full amount.
The issuer could then use an amount proposed in those offering documents—
perhaps $200,000 or $400,000—to complete the necessary Reg A+ paperwork
and pay for future filings. If successful, after the crowdfunding shareholders had
read the offering documents and had a chance to vote, then the offering would
be completed if a majority (or supermajority) of shareholders approved. If not,
the investors would receive back their investment (a redemption right), less the
cost of the disclosure documents—perhaps 95 cents on the dollar. The issuer
would be free to impose a vesting schedule on its officers—and, indeed, would
be well advised to do so, and to advertise that fact in its offering documents.
One drawback to the Reg A+ approach is that the offering could raise only
$50 million in the first year.354 This may not be enough money for the project,
although it is nearly fifty times the current crowdfunding limit.355 And
organizers could always return to the capital markets twelve months later.356
Indeed, as discussed earlier, this type of staged financing is a protective
mechanism that venture capitalists typically employ.357
B. Intrastate Offering
Because the basis for federal regulation is interstate commerce, intrastate
offerings are free from federal regulation.358 Not waiting for federal
crowdfunding legislation, in 2011, Georgia enacted the Invest Georgia
Exemption (IGE)359 to take advantage of just this exemption to offer an early

352
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(b)(2)(E), 126 Stat. 306, 324 (2012)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(E) (2012)).
353
Id. § 401(b)(2)(F)–(G), 126 Stat. at 324 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(F)–(G) (2012)).
354
17 C.F.R. § 230.251.
355
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
356
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (restricting the limit of aggregate offers within a twelve-month period).
357
See supra Part II.B.1.
358
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–53 (1995) (explaining that the U.S. Constitution gives
the federal government the power to regulate interstate commerce).
359
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08 (2011).
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species of crowdfunding.360 The statute allows certain for-profit entities to raise
up to $5 million a year from Georgia resident investors.361 Investments are
limited to $10,000 unless the investor qualifies as an accredited investor.362
Georgia requires those entities who wish to take advantage of the program to file
a two-page form,363 similar to the Form D used by the SEC, but requiring much
less information.364 The form must be filed by the issuer with the Commissioner
before engaging in any general solicitation efforts or the sale of the security.365
More than seventy-five companies have filed notice with the Commissioner
under the IGE.366
Intrastate offerings are thus a possibility, although a tricky one. Section
3(a)(11) of the Securities Act exempts an issuance of securities offered and sold
only to state residents, where the issuer is incorporated in that same state and
doing business in it.367 Generally, “doing business” has been interpreted to mean
that a substantial, but not exclusive, portion of business is within that state.368
Purchasers can resell the securities without restriction to another bona fide
360

OFFICE OF THE GA. SEC’Y OF STATE, SEC. DIV., UNDERSTANDING THE INVEST GEORGIA EXEMPTION

(2014).
361
Kemp Expands Georgia’s Crowdfunding Rule, GA. SECRETARY ST., http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/
general/kemp_expands_georgias_crowdfunding_rule (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
362
Invest Georgia Exemption, GA. SECRETARY ST., https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/securities/invest_
georgia_exemption (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
363
Office of the Sec’y of State, Comm’r of Sec., Form GA-1 Invest Georgia Exemption, GA. SECRETARY
ST., http://sos.ga.gov/admin/uploads/Invest_Georgia_Exemption_-_Form_GA-1_(v7.2017)_5.pdf (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Form GA-1].
364
Christopher Douglas Mitchell, Chartering a New Revolution in Equity Crowdfunding: The Rise of State
Crowdfunding Regimes in Response to the Inadequacy of Title III of the JOBS Act, 3 J. MARSHALL GLOBAL
MKTS. L.J. 135, 174 (2015).
365
Form GA-1, supra note 363. Along with the $5 million limit and the $10,000 per investor cap for nonaccredited investors, businesses must meet the following requirements: (1) the company must be a for-profit
entity that has its principal place of business, and is doing business, in Georgia, (2) all investments received must
be deposited in a bank or depository institution authorized to do business in Georgia, (3) the issuer must inform
all purchasers that the securities are not registered and are subject to resale limitations under Rule 147(e), and
(4) offers to sell securities can only be made to residents, or individuals the issuing company reasonably believes
to be residents, of Georgia. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08 (2017).
366
See Invest Georgia Exemption, supra note 362; see also Kemp: New Federal Crowdfunding Rules Take
Effect Today, GA. SECRETARY ST., http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/securities/kemp_new_federal_crowdfunding_
rules_take_effect_today (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (explaining that one Georgia business, GROUNDFLOOR,
raised $1.7 million under the exemption during the year-long pilot). Another company, Gramarye Media,
launched a Georgia-based entertainment studio through an ICO. Gramarye Media Launches Georgia
Entertainment Studio Funded by a Cryptocurrency Initial Coin Offering, MKTS. INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2018, 8:00
AM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/gramarye-media-launches-georgia-entertainmentstudio-funded-by-a-cryptocurrency-initial-coin-offering-1022668879. The company is offering 5 million of the
175 million tokens available to both accredited and unaccredited Georgia investors under the IGE. Id.
367
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012).
368
The SEC created a “safe-harbor” rule that provides a list of ways that an issuer can satisfy the “doing
business” requirement, including having 80% of its assets in the state. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2) (2017).
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resident of the state and can resell to nonresidents after a nine-month holding
period.369 Best of all, there is no monetary limit on the amount of funds that can
be raised.370
This exemption is actually quite promising: There is no monetary ceiling,
and in a populous state like New York or California, both the initial offering and
resale market would be considerable. There is one problem: General solicitation
is not permitted, and crowdfunding issuers would have to come up with a reliable
way to offer their shares only to residents of a single state.371
Technology may make it possible to work with this rule. States could create
a website that is only accessible after proof of residence—perhaps by submitting
a driver’s license or other proof of state residency. California residents could
then have access to California offerings, New Yorkers to New York offerings,
and so on. State securities regulators could impose their own requirements and
monitoring. Chief among them, they would have to ensure that resales were
limited to state residents, at least for the first nine months.
The fly in the ointment may be the “doing business” in the state requirement,
which the statute does not define.372 In Chapman v. Dunn, the Sixth Circuit held
that an issuer must conduct a “predominant” amount of its business within its
state of residence.373 While it is not necessary that a business is conducted
exclusively in the state,374 to meet the “doing business” requirement, a business
cannot conduct all or most of its income-producing operations in another state.375
Rule 147, which the SEC promulgated as a safe harbor, sets out several
requirements for a business to satisfy the “doing business” requirement. One is
incorporating and locating a principal office in state, which would be simple
enough.376 Rule 147 also requires that the offeror satisfy one of the following
tests:
(1)

369

The issuer derived at least 80% of its consolidated gross revenues
from the operation of a business or of real property located in or
from the rendering of services within such state or territory;

Id. § 230.147(e).
See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (imposing no monetary limit on the intrastate exemption).
371
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(d).
372
See 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11).
373
414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969).
374
See 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation—Federal § 90, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019).
375
See Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 658 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Conducting substantially all incomeproducing operations elsewhere defeats the [§ 3(a)(11)] exemption.” (citing Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153,
158–59 (6th Cir. 1969))).
376
17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c) (2017).
370
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The issuer had at the end of its most recent semi-annual fiscal
period prior to an initial offer of securities in any offering or
subsequent offering pursuant to this section, at least 80% of its
assets and those of its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis located
within such state or territory;
The issuer intends to use and uses at least 80% of the net proceeds
to the issuer from sales made … in connection with the operation
of a business or of real property, the purchase of real property
located in, or the rendering of services within such state or
territory; or
A majority of the issuer’s employees are based in such state or
territory.377

State crowdfunding issuers would have to be careful to meet one of these
requirements to qualify for the safe harbor Rule 147 affords. Most attractively,
Rule 147A allows for advertising to the general public—that is, outside the
state—as long as the final investors are in-state.378
The most interesting aspect of this route is that it could bypass the SEC
altogether. It could also allow state securities regulators to experiment with
different requirements for crowdfunding in classic “laboratories of the states”
fashion.379 It remains an open question whether states have an interest in
facilitating these offerings for their residents, but there is reason to think some
states may be eager for such room to experiment in how best to foster small
businesses. Wyoming, for example, appears to be aiming to become the most
crypto-friendly state in an effort to draw new industry to the state, mirroring its
efforts in the 1970s when it was the first state to allow LLCs.380 The Wyoming
legislature passed five pieces of legislation aimed at attracting blockchain and
cryptocurrency businesses,381 which has resulted in a handful of companies
377

Id. § 230.147(c)(2).
Id. § 230.147A(b), (d).
379
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments ….”).
380
Ben Bain, Crypto’s Wild, Wild West, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 21, 2018, at 36, 36.
381
Two are especially noteworthy: HB 70 provides that the development, sale, or facilitating of the
exchange of a utility token is not subject to specified securities and money transmission laws; and SF 111 makes
it so cryptocurrency is not taxed as “property” in Wyoming. H.R. 0070, 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-105 (2019). Additionally, HB 19 provides an exemption for virtual currency used
within Wyoming from money transmitter laws and regulations, undoing legislation that was passed in 2015
barring the use of cryptocurrency in Wyoming money transmitters, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-22-104 (2019); HB
101 provides for the maintenance of corporate records of Wyoming entities via blockchain, WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-16-1601 (2019); and HB 126 permits the formation of “Series LLCs,” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-211
(2019). Cf. CT Corp. Staff, Series LLCs: Wise Option or Risky Strategy, WOLTERS KLUWER (Aug. 11, 2015),
https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/series-llcs-wise-option-or-risky-strategy (“In the simplest
378

RODRIGUESPROOFS_12.5.19

456

12/9/2019 11:37 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:397

registering in the state,382 with dozens more expected.383
State competition for business remains high—one need only look to various
states that vied to give Amazon a second headquarters.384 A state could follow
Georgia or Wyoming’s lead and loosen crowdfunding rules to attract businesses
to the state, while gaining political capital with constituents by favoring local
small businesses.
C. Section 28
Finally, Section 28 of the Securities Act provides the SEC with the following
broad powers:
[The SEC may,] by rule or regulation … conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any
class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any
provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or regulation
issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such exemption is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with
the protection of investors.385

The SEC has not used this power often.386 In 1999, it increased the monetary
amount of stock that can be issued under Rule 701 by invoking its exemptive
authority under Section 28 of the Securities Act.387 In 2016, it promulgated Rule
147A under its Section 28 powers.388 You will recall that we discussed Rule 147
as a way for states to facilitate intrastate offerings.389 Rule 147A has the same
requirements as 147, with two key differences: (1) Rule 147A allows offers of
terms, a Series LLC (limited liability Company) is an umbrella that shelters a number of independently operating
LLCs under the master LLC.”). The Wyoming Blockchain Coalition, a grassroots effort aimed at bringing
blockchain business to Wyoming, led the recent cryptocurrency push. Bain, supra note 380, at 36. The Coalition
has claimed to have been contacted by dozens of businesses seeking to move to Wyoming and has helped a new
blockchain finance corporation file in the state. Id. at 36–37.
382
Bain, supra note 380, at 37.
383
Morgan N. Temte, Comment, Blockchain Challenges Traditional Contract Law: Just How Smart Are
Contracts?, 19 WYO. L. REV. 87, 88 & n.7 (2019).
384
See Nick Wingfield, Local Expertise, in 238 Places, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2018, at B1 (noting that 238
cities and states bid to be Amazon’s next headquarters).
385
15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2012).
386
See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4:117, Westlaw
(database updated May 2019) (“At the time of this writing, the SEC has not, however, used [Section 28] authority
[elsewhere] ….”).
387
See id.
388
Allen Sparkman & Adrienne Randle Bond, Management Responsibilities of Governing Persons of
Corporations and Limited Liability Companies, Including Fiduciary Duties and Law of Agency, and Compliance
with Federal and State Securities Laws in Fund-Raising, 37 CORP. COUNS. REV. 175, 206 (2018).
389
See supra Part V.B.
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securities to be accessible to out-of-state residents so long as sales are made only
to in-state residents; and (2) Rule 147A allows issuers to be incorporated out-ofstate so long as their “principal place of business” is in-state and they
demonstrate at least one in-state “doing business” requirement.390
It is unlikely that the SEC would create a regulatory framework for highdollar crowdfunding under Section 28. Historical examples of its use have been
relatively small-bore, as just discussed. But the agency’s mission is to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.391 It could theoretically serve this mission by replicating via
rulemaking the investor protections of vesting of founder equity, staged
financing, and a redemption right powered by escrow.392
CONCLUSION
Capital raising today is stratified into the “haves” and “have-nots.” The
traditional public/private divide required a choice between a difficult IPO
process that brought with it access to the public markets and easy resale, or a
relatively painless private offering process that imposed more limitations on
resale and was open only to the wealthy. Recent regulation has blurred one side
of the divide, giving private offerings more and more public attributes—like
general solicitation and fewer restrictions on resale. On the other side of the
divide, Reg A+ and equity crowdfunding have nominally loosened constraints
but have not garnered broad support from either the investing public or the
entrepreneurial community.
The VC model provides a time-tested blueprint for how sophisticated private
actors protect themselves from the risks of uncertainty, asymmetric information,
and agency costs. The ICO phenomenon offered a unique opportunity to
examine financial contracting with the crowd “in the wild,” free from the
interpolation of the state. As such, ICOs provide the chance to think about how
we might open up the public markets to private companies in new ways, while
preserving the concern for investor protection that undergirds our securities
laws.
Now crowdfunding exists nominally, but signs suggest that it may be, or at
least risks becoming, a market for lemons. This Article concludes that Congress,
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the SEC, and the states can couple the traditional VC model with the innovations
ICOs offer to think creatively about contractual mechanisms that can create a
viable future for equity crowdfunding.

